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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE GENIUS of the Anglo-American legal system is its capacity for
change. When old legal forms have become inflexibly encrusted with
institutional barnacles to the point where they no longer can provide effec-
tive and acceptable legal solutions, the old form is either modified or
replaced. It is not so much that the old form has become incapable of
handling the problems for which it was originally intended, rather that
the problems for which it is currently being used are different, and the
old form lacks the capacity to adapt to changes in the environment. Legal
history teaches that new methods or devices have often been engrafted on
an old form, and adequate flexibility has thereby been achieved. On
other occasions, however, either by legislative action or by common law
development, relatively new jurisprudential forms have emerged. Both
of these processes have been at work since the beginning of the system.
Thus, when the Court of King's Bench became more concerned with the
forms of action than with the substance of actions, the Court of Chancery
and its equity jurisdiction evolved to meet the need for a more responsive
system of remedies.1 Several centuries later the Field Code, and later pro-
cedural codes modeled after it, accomplished a substantial merger of law
and equity." And the adoption and subsequent influence of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,' emphasizing simplification and functionalism,
marked still another landmark in procedural reform. The vast growth in
both administrative law and the practice of arbitration are further ex-
amples of the phenomenal regenerative power of our legal system.
The focus of this paper is on the current need for procedural reform in
one area of the system-the administration and enforcement of labor law
under the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA)" and the Railway
Labor Act (RLA)." The analysis which follows and the reforms which are
suggested comprise a working hypothesis--or perhaps more accurately a
trial balloon. The conclusions are only tentative and will require further
study and testing. With these reservations, the highlights of the evidence
and the procedural modifications to which they seem to point will be
examined.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. Centrality Of Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining is where we begin the analysis, because collective
bargaining is central to the federal scheme which regulates the relationship
of employees to management; it is the stated policy upon which both the
1 See generally, F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE, Chap. 1 (1965).
2 See generally, A. ScoTr AND R. KENT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE,
Chap. V (1967).3 FED. R. CIr. P. 1 et seq.
4 Labor-Mariagement Relatiohs Act (Taft-Hartley), §§ 1-502, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1964), amending 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
'Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 54 Stat. 785-86, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-62
(1964).
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Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' are
premised. The familiar statutory phrases are basic: Encouragement of
"the practice and procedure of collective bargaining;"7 and establishment
of a "duty . . . to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions ...."
Both statutes use identical language to guarantee employees the right to
"bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing."9
Thus, collective bargaining is the essence of the statutes; all of the pro-
visions in these laws are structured either to protect or to regulate collec-
tive bargaining. For example, the unfair labor practices under the Taft-
Hartley Act are designed essentially to: (1) Protect employees in their
right to join unions, subject to freedom of choice, in order that they may
share in the collective bargaining process;" (2) protect employees from
unions when unions abuse bargaining power;" (3) establish and define a
legal obligation to bargain between the employer and the union repre-
senting a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit;"
and (4) curb those union practices deemed excessive, for example, certain
secondary activity and picketing for organization and recognition-prac-
tices which might otherwise inordinately reinforce union bargaining
power." The Railway Labor Act has comparable though not identical
substantive provisions.4 Whether by Congressional intent or by judicial
construction, except for the absence of secondary boycott prohibitions in
the RLA,- there is little difference in the substantive duties and obligations
which the two statutes require employers and unions to exercise toward
each other and toward employees. The important difference lies in pro-
cedure. Thus, the theme of substantive identity and procedural diversity
runs through the legal history of the two statutes.
B. Similarity Of Substantive Law Under Railway Labor Act And
Labor-Management Relations Act
Several familiar examples illustrate the similarity in substantive require-
ments of the two Acts:
In 1943 the Supreme Court decided two cases which confirmed the
supremacy of the collective bargaining agreement over the individual
'National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §5 151-68 (1964),
amending 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
'Labor-Management Relations Act, Title I of Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as
amended, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964), amending 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
'Railway Labor Act, § 2, First, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 64 Stat. 1238. 45 U.S.C.
5 152 (1964).
' Railway Labor Act, 5 2, Fourth, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C.
152, Fourth (1964); Labor-Management Relations Act, § 7, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964), amending 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
"OLabor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157,
158(a)(1), 158(a)(3), 159 (1964), amending 49 Stat. 432 (1935).
1"Id. §§ 158(b)(1)(A), 158(b) (2).
12id. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(2).
"Isd. §§ 158(b)(4), 158(b)(7), 158(e), 187.
'4 Railway Labor Act § 2, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 62 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. § 152
(1964).
"See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
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contract of employment-]. I. Case v. NLRB,'" which arose under the
NLRA, and Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency,17 which arose under
the RLA. The law announced by the Court was identical under both
statutes: A contract of employment between an employer and an indi-
vidual employee could not supersede the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement executed by the employer and the majority representative of
the employees.
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills," the Court established the enforce-
ability of a collective bargaining agreement as a matter of federal sub-
stantive law under section 301 of Taft-Hartley. 9 Later, in Machinists
Union v. Central Airlines,"° it held that an airline system board contract
under section 204 of the Railway Labor Act,"' "like the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act § 301 contract, is a federal contract and is therefore
governed and enforceable by federal law, in the federal courts."'
The doctrine of fair representation,' although not spelled out by either
statute, was first announced under the RLA by the Supreme Court in
1944 in Steele v. Louisville &4 N.R.R.' Nine years later, in Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman," the Court also found the doctrine subsisting in the
Taft-Hartley Act, although the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
waited until 1962 before deciding that a union's breach of this duty con-
stituted an unfair labor practice.' Except for substantial differences in
means of enforcement, the fair representation doctrine under both statutes
appears to be basically the same. 7
When both the NLRB and the Supreme Court determined in the Fibre-
board cases that contracting out of bargaining unit work which resulted
in a lay-off of employees was a mandatory subject of bargaining, they
were but following a precedent already established in a railroad case,
Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co." In Telegraphers the Court had
held a union's demand that station agent jobs not be abolished except by
18321 U.S. 332 (1943).
17321 U.S. 342 (1943).
'8372 U.S. 682 (1963).
"9Labor-Management Relations Act, § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1964), amending 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
20372 U.S. 682 (1963).
"' Railway Labor Act § 204, 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1964): "It shall be the duty of
every carrier and of its employees, acting through their representatives . .. to establish a board of
adjustment . . .not exceeding the jurisdiction which may lawfully be exercised by system, group,
or regional boards of adjustment, under authority of section 153 of this title."
aa 372 U.S. at 692.
2' For a recent discussion of the doctrine, see Aaron, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation
under the Railway Labor and National Labor Relations Acts, 34 J. AlR L. & CoM. 167 (1969).
24323 U.S. 192 (1944).
2 34 5 U.S. 330 (1953).26 Miranda Fuel Oil Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 enf. denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
Followed in United Rubber Wkrs. Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 837 (1967).
21 "The statutory duty of fair representation was developed over 20 years ago in a series of
cases involving alleged racial discrimination by unions certified as exclusive bargaining representatives
under the Railway Labor Act, .. . and was soon extended to unions certified under the N.L.R.A.
. .. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1966). "[T]he Board adopted and applied the doctrine
as it had been developed by the federal courts." Id. at 181.
"s Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, modified, 138 N.L.R.B. 67, enforced,
322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
29 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
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agreement of the union and the carrier to be a bargainable issue that
"plainly referred to 'conditions of employment'."'"
The foregoing examples are typical of a frequently exercised tendency
to find the same rights and obligations under both statutes. But it is not
my purpose either to prove or disprove a general similarity in the statutes.
Certainly there are many differences. For instance, under the Railway
Labor Act collective agreements may continue for indefinite duration,
even surviving changes in bargaining representatives. Contrary to the
NLRA rule, a new RLA representative must accept its predecessor's agree-
ment, and can obtain changes in that agreement only after completion of
bargaining in accordance with section 6 procedures." "The effect of § 6
is to prolong agreements subject to its provisions regardless of what they
may say as to termination."' However, even this difference is more apparent
than real. Although the NLRB guarantees that a newly-elected successor
union under Taft-Hartley is entitled to bargain for a fresh agreement,"
the employer is not allowed to make unilateral changes in wages and
working conditions prior to a bargaining impasse;" in effect, the sub-
stantive provisions of the prior agreement continue. The NLRB's prohibi-
tion against pre-impasse unilateral changes is thus strikingly similar to
the status quo requirements which sections 5, 6 and 10 of the RLA impose
on carriers," although Taft-Hartley imposes no comparable restriction
on a union engaging in a pre-impasse strike, except in those rare instances
where a union runs afoul of the sixty-day notice provision of section
8 (d).3"
An area in which the statutes are totally different is in the treatment
accorded secondary boycotts. The Railway Labor Act is silent on the
subject, as was the original Wagner Act. The 1947 and 1959 amendments'
to the National Labor Relations Act, however, created an intricate sys-
tem of "taboos"' which prohibits most forms of secondary picketing,"
outlaws "hot cargo" agreements,' and provides for private damage suits
for injuries caused by unlawful secondary activity.4' Acknowledging the
'
0 id. at 336.
" Railway Labor Act, § 6, 44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964). See Order
of Ry. Conductors & Brakemen v. Switchmen's Union of No. America, 269 F.2d 726 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 899 (1959); Cf. Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817 (1964), and So. Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen, 337 F.2d 127
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
"Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
817 (1964).
"
5 American Seating Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 800 (1952).
34 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
'Railway Labor Act §§ 5, 6 & 10, 44 Stat. 580, 582, 586 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat. 197.
63 Stat. 107, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155, 156, 160 (1964). So. Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen, 337
F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
8 Cf. Lion Oil Co. v. NLRB, 352 U.S. 282 (1957).
'7 Pub. L. No. 80-101, and Pub. L. No. 86-257, amending 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
8 Compare Int'l Union of Elec. Wkrs., Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961), with NLRB
v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
"8 Labor-Management Relations Act, S 8(b) (4), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 5
158(b) (4) (1964), amending 49 Stat. 452 (1935).4
0Id. § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e).
41 Id. S 303, 29 U.S.C. S 187.
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continuing vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,' the Supreme Court has
declined to confer judicial extension of secondary boycott prohibitions to
union conduct governed by the RLA." Significantly, notwithstanding the
absence of such prohibitions, unions operating under the RLA usually
have not felt the need to engage in secondary boycott activity."
The description which emerges is that despite some dissimilarities, the
substantive legal relationships prevailing between a union and an employer
toward each other, and also toward employees, display a general likeness
under both the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations
Act. The differences which do exist-and they are striking-are rooted
primarily in history and in procedure.'
C. The Basic Structure Of Existing Law
My purpose in calling attention to substantive similarities was only to
set the stage for an assault on procedural diversity. Diversity as such would
not be objectionable if the procedures under each statute were not in-
herently inadequate. It is my hypothesis that the existing procedures for
the administration and enforcement of the nation's principal labor laws
tend to delay and often defeat the efficient and just application of the
rights and duties promised by those laws.
Every 12 years since 1935, the NLRA has received a major Con-
gressional overhaul. Conditions may again be ripe at the end of the cur-
rent 12-year period-1971-for Congress to act. Action would be de-
sirable if the resulting legislation were the product of a quality of states-
manship not heretofore visible in the passage of the Wagner," Taft-
Hartley,47 and Landrum-Griflin Acts. By contrast, the various stages of
the Railway Labor Act were enacted as a result of a high degree of coopera-
tion, which seemed to develop at appropriate times, between unions and
management on the railroads." Such cooperation never prevailed in the
enactment of the National Labor Relations Act and its amendments,
and probably it will never exist as long as proposed amendments are
"Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1932).
"4Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
"Id. The picketing at the Jacksonville terminal was an exception precisely because the labor
dispute with the Florida East Coast Railway Co. was being handled locally rather than nationally.
Traditionally, the railroads and the unions with whom they deal have engaged in industry-wide
bargaining, i.e., "national handling" of major issues. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. Co., 383 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1047 (1968).
4Id. For example, it is not uncommon on the railroads for a minority union to handle griev-
ances for its members under the collective bargaining agreement of the majority union which
formally represents the employees of the craft or class. Cf. Locomotive Engineers v. Denver &
R.G.W.RR, 290 F. Supp. 612 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd, - F.2d - (10th Cir. 1969) [71 L.R.R.M.
2690]; McElroy v. Terminal RR Ass'n, 392 F.2d 966 (7th Cir. 1968). The most unique feature
of collective bargaining on the railroads, however, is the almost absolute reliance on industry-wide
bargaining.
'See Keyserling, The Wagner-Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 199 (1960); Madden, The Origin and Early History of the National Labor Relations Board,
29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 234 (1960).
47See Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 285
(1960); H. MILLIS & E. BRowN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY (1950).
48A. McADAMS, POWER AND POLITICS IN LABoR LEGISLATION (1964).
4"See, dissenting opinion, Frankfurter, J., in Railway Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S.
225, 240 (1956), for a description of passage of the 1926 Act, and Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v.
Chicago River & I. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 37, for discussion of the 1934 Act.
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identifiable as either anti-labor or pro-labor. Being essentially an optimist,
however, I suggest that legislative cooperation between labor and man-
agement is not impossible. Cooperation might be attained if it were widely
recognized and accepted that the basic structure of collective bargaining
in American labor law is already firmly established-a conclusion I believe
to be valid.
The essentials of this basic structure may be simply stated: (1) Em-
ployees in an appropriate unit shall have an opportunity,' through majority
designation, to be represented exclusively by a labor union for purposes
of collective bargaining, including grievance handling. (2) The employer
and this union are required to bargain in good faith as to wages and other
conditions of employment and to reduce their bargain to a contract. (3)
The contract is judicially enforceable, though in most instances some
form of arbitration is the primary means of enforcement. (4) The eco-
nomic weapons which the parties may use to establish or influence collec-
tive bargaining, including strikes, lockouts, secondary boycotts, picketing
and handbilling, are subject to limitations which are now reasonably well
defined, at least under the National Labor Relations Act. (5) Neither the
employer nor the union may discriminate against employees in the exercise
of the foregoing rights and obligations. That is the structure. Everything
else is detail and refinement.
Organized labor should now understand and accept the fact that his-
tory is not likely to reverse itself and remove restrictions on secondary
boycotts; management should now understand that the clock is not likely
to be turned back to pre-Wagner Act days when employers (other than
railroads) had no legal obligation to deal with unions and union adherents
could be fired at will. Consequently, it is too late to debate the underlying
philosophy of collective bargaining.
I do not mean to imply that the law under these statutes is settled or
that all of the rules have been stabilized. The opposite is true. Practitioners
and teachers are still dependent on loose-leaf services because of the fre-
quency with which the decisional law changes. Many legal details, of both
legislative and judicial origin, are in a state of flux. This is to be expected
in a dynamic society where interpretation of rules of law must necessarily
give and bend to adapt to changes in technology and other developments
in the economy. Yet in the times immediately ahead, I hope that Congress
will not involve itself in the sterile process of second-guessing the NLRB
and the Supreme Court as to the proper interpretation which should be
given to broad substantive provisions in the statutes. The strength of
these statutes may lie in their generality, which allows them to be adapted
to a myriad of changing situations."5 I hope that congressional attention
s0 The Labor-Management Relations Act also guarantees employees the right to refrain from
engaging in union activities. §5 7 and 8(b) (1) (A), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 157, 158(b)(1)(A) (1964), amending 49 Stat. 432 (1935).
5' E.g., American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (legality of offensive lock-
out); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (duty to bargain about
contracting out of bargaining unit work); John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964)
(liability of merger employer under predecessor's collective bargaining agreement); Republic Avia-
tion Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (no-solicitation rule unlawful during nonworking time).
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will be concentrated instead upon the administration and enforcement of
existing substantive law. If the leadership of both unions and manage-
ment are willing to accept, as an established fact, that the basic pattern
of the governing law relating to collective bargaining is not likely to
change in the foreseeable future-that neither side alone is strong enough
to force revision in the basic structure--they might find it to their mutual
advantage to combine with other elements in the national community in
a good faith legislative effort to achieve fundamental revision in the ad-
ministration and enforcement of this law. Such an observation may be
only wishful thinking; nevertheless, the challenge is there-a challenge
premised on the general acceptability of the substantive labor law as now
written."
D. The Procedural Jungle
The procedural law under both statutes-the Railway Labor Act and
the Taft-Hartley Act-is an overgrown jungle. Examination of the criti-
cism frequently leveled at both Acts reveals that most complaints relate
to the manner in which existing tribunals have interpreted certain statu-
tory provisions and the way in which the administrative and enforcement
machinery works-or fails to work." We shall examine some of these
complaints; however, first let us briefly tour this procedural jungle of
conflicting and overlapping tribunals.
1. Tribunals under the RLA
The tour begins with an examination of the tribunals and agencies
charged with administration and enforcement of the Railway Labor Act:
a. National Mediation Board (NMB)-This tribunal serves the follow-
ing functions: (1) It handles representation cases under section 2, Ninth
by determining appropriate bargaining units within the statutory phrase
"craft or class," conducting investigations (which may include holding
hearings and elections) to determine the majority representative of each
craft or class and certifying representatives for purposes of collective
bargaining." (2) Within the limited framework of its functions under
section 2, Ninth, it settles certain types of "jurisdictional disputes," at
least those in which conflicting union claims of representation can be de-
cided by defining the craft or class and certifying the exclusive representa-
tive of the employees.' (3) It provides mediation and related statutory
2I do not mean to imply that efforts to achieve substantive improvement in the basic laws
should not be pursued. Those efforts should and undoubtedly will continue to be made in order
to adjust the law to changing needs and also to close loopholes revealed by usage and judicial inter-
pretation. And efforts should certainly be made to improve the emergency disputes provisions of
both the RLA and the LMRA. See Morris, Labor Law Revision: Some Preliminary Observations,
35 J. o' AsK L. & CoM. 433 (1969) Revisions such as these, however, should not affect the basic
legal structure of collective bargaining.
" See, Hearings on Congressional Oversight of Administrative Agencies (NLRB) Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the judiciary, U.S. Senate, 90th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (Parts 1 and 2) (1968).
"
4 Railway Labor Act, § 5, 44 Stat. 480 (1926), as amended, 63 Stat. 107, 45 U.S.C. § 155(1964).
5 Railway Labor Act, § 2, Ninth, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. §
152 (1964).
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procedures to aid in the settlement of "major" disputes which require the
service of a section 6 notice in order to change "rates of pay, rules or
working conditions of employees, as a class as embodied in agreements.""
(4) It appoints neutral arbitrators to sit on the various adjustment boards
authorized to settle the "minor" disputes, which concern the application
or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. 7 (5) Under section
5, Second the NMB may interpret, at the request of either party, any
collective bargaining agreement that is "reached through mediation." 8
b. National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB)-This statutory
Board is established pursuant to section 3 of the RLA and has jurisdiction
over minor disputes59 on the railroads. As the Supreme Court held in
Transportation-Communication Employees v. Union Pacific R.R.,' this
jurisdiction also requires the NRAB to determine disputes between differ-
ent unions which claim the same work under their respective collective
bargaining agreements these are garden-variety "jurisdictional disputes."
c. Special Boards of Adjustment-These boards are established by agree-
ment, usually between a railroad and a single union, to hear and determine
minor dispute cases which would otherwise be referable to the NRAB.'
d. Public Law Boards-These boards were authorized by the 1966
amendments to the Act." They also have jurisdiction over minor disputes
on a given railroad and may be established at the request of either the
railroad or the representative of the employees to handle disputes which
would otherwise be referable to the NRAB, or which have been pending
before the NRAB for at least a year. Also, they may have jurisdiction
over such other disputes as the parties may agree to submit.
e. Airline Adjustment Boards-These tribunals are generally organized
as system boards of adjustment. Section 204 requires that they be established
by air carriers and unions to hear and determine all disputes arising under
collective bargaining agreements.' It is likely that the authority of such
boards to decide inter-union jurisdictional disputes would also be governed
by the Transportation-Communication Employees" case.
5 Railway Labor Act, § 2, Seventh, and § 6, 44 Stat. 577, 582 (1926), as amended, 64 Star.
1238, 48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, Seventh, and 156 (1964). See Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry.
Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945).5 7 Infra notes 61-63, and Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945).
"SRailway Labor Act § 5, 44 Stat. 580 (1926), as amended, 63 Stat. 107, 45 U.S.C. § 155
(1964).
" The Railway Labor Act establishes four divisions of the National Railroad Adjustment Board,
dividing the jurisdiction of the boards as to type of employee. The first three divisions have ten
members each (five from labor and five from the carriers); the fourth is a residual board with six
members, having jurisdiction over carriers directly or indirectly by water and any type or class
not included in the other three. Railway Labor Act § 3, 44 Stat. 578 (1926), as amended, 45
U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
60385 U.S. 157 (1966).
61 Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 80 Stat. 208, 45 U.S.C. S 153 (1964).
See THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 49 (1966).
62 Pub. L. No. 89-456, 80 Stat. 208 (1966); 44 Stat. 578, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153,
second (1964). See THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 50
(1966).
"'Railway Labor Act S 204, 49 Star. 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1964). See THIRTY-SECOND AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE NA-IONAL MEDIATION BOARD 49 (1966).
64385 U.S. 157 (1966).
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f. Federal District Courts-These courts have the following jurisdiction
under the RLA: (1) They directly enforce the substantive duties under
the statute, principally by injunction,"5 but may also, as illustrated by the
Fifth Circuit's back-pay decision in Galveston Wharves," award monetary
damages. Included within the jurisdiction of the federal courts are suits
against unions for violation of the duty of fair representation."' As the
Supreme Court recently held in Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.,"
a fair representation suit may be joined with an action against the carrier
for violation of the collective agreement without prior exhaustion of con-
tract or adjustment board remedies where the effort to use those remedies
would be futile. Also included within this general jurisdiction is the
authority of the district courts to enjoin strikes over matters concerning
minor disputes for which an adjustment board would have primary juris-
diction." Assertion of this jurisdiction represents an accommodation be-
tween the RLA and the Norris-LaGuardia Act."° (2) The district courts
also have jurisdiction to enforce, with only limited judicial review, awards
of the various adjustment boards previously enumerated.71 (3) The federal
courts have diversity jurisdiction in damage suits brought by employees
against carriers for wrongful discharge where reinstatement is not sought.7"
In such actions, administrative and contractual remedies need not be ex-
hausted except where required by applicable state law. 3
g. State Courts-State courts also have jurisdiction of the last type of
action in which employees sue for damages for wrongful discharge.'
65 Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v.
Chicago River & I. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1956).
6" United Indus. Wkrs. Seafarers Int'l Union v. Galveston Wharves, 400 F.2d 320 (1968).
67Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
68393 U.S. 324 (1969). But cf. Brady v. Trans-World Airlines, 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969).
9 Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1956); Flight Eng. Int'l
Ass'n v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d s (5th Cir. 1962). In Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers v.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528 (1960), the Supreme Court recognized the jurisdic-
tion of a district court to condition its injunction against a strike concerning a minor dispute with
a requirement that the carrier maintain the status quo pending NRAB determination of the dis-
pute. See also Local Lodge 2144, Bhd. of Railway & Airline Clerks v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
- F.2d - (2d Cir. 1969), [70 L.R.R.M. 3295], holding that a union was entitled to a preliminary
injunction maintaining the status quo pending adjustment board determination of the grievance
because of a real threat of irreparable injury to the employees; no strike was involved in the case.
But see Hilbert v. Penn. R.R. Co., 290 F.2d 881 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 900
(1961), and Switchmen's Union of North America v. Cent. of Ga. Ry., 341 F.2d 213 (5th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 841 (1966).
5 This assertion of jurisdiction under the RLA contrasts with the reluctance of the Supreme
Court to achieve a similar accommodation under § 301 of Taft-Hartley. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkin-
son, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
"
t Railway Labor Act, § 3, First (M), (P), and § 204, 44 Star. 577 (1926), as amended, 80
Star. 208, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964). See Gunther v. San Diego & Arizona Eastern Ry., 382 U.S.
257 (1965); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963); Comment, Review
of Adjustment Board Awards Under the Railway Labor Act, 34 J. AiR L. & CoM. 233 (1968);
Kroner, Judicial Review of System Board Awards Under the Railway Labor Act: Some Problems
and Opinions, 35 J. AIR L. & CoM. 358 (1969).
"' Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953); Slocum v. D., L. &
W.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239 (1950); Moore v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 630 (1941); Cf.
Walker v. Southern R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 196 (1966); Union Pacific R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601
(1959); Pacilio v. Penn. R.R. Co., 381 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1967).
7' Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953).
74 E.g., Scott v. National Airlines, Inc., 142 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1962); Crockett v. Union Terminal
Co., 342 S.W.2d 129 (1960).
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h. Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)-Under section 401 (k) (4) of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 , an air carrier is required to comply with
the Railway Labor Act as a condition to holding a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. The CAB thus has jurisdiction to enforce the
Railway Labor Act by cancelling or withholding certification pending
compliance with that Act. The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit has agreed with the CAB that assertion of this jurisdiction is
largely discretionary."a The most notable exercise of this jurisdiction
occurred during the pilots' strike at Southern Airways, when the CAB,"
in disagreement with a federal district court ' which had also assumed
jurisdiction of the same parties and subject matter, found Southern guilty
of refusing to bargain about super-seniority that had been given to strike
replacements. The CAB, in the manner of the NLRB, ordered the carrier
to bargain and imposed various conditions to require compliance.'
Each of these eight tribunals, or groups of tribunals, has original juris-
diction over various aspects of the administration and enforcement of rights
and duties under the Railway Labor Act.
2. Tribunals under the LMRA.
We turn now to an examination of the tribunals and agencies respon-
sible for administering and enforcing the law and policy of the Labor-
Management Relations Act.
a. National Labor Relations Board-The NLRB exercises the following
functions: (1) It handles representation cases under section 9 of the Act,
including the holding of hearings, determining appropriate bargaining
units, conducting elections and certifying bargaining representatives."s
(2) It decides unfair labor practice cases, a function which is essentially
judicial. The term "unfair labor practice" is a statutory euphemism de-
fining a violation of a substantive requirement of the Act." Remedial
orders in unfair labor practice cases are not self-enforcing; therefore, to
' 72 Stat. 754, as amended, 76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1964). See generally Comment,
CAB and Labor Jurisdiction, 33 J. OF Amt L. & COM. 334 (1967).
7' Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 360 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Flight Eng.
Int'l Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 332 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also Air Line Employees
Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1969), [71 L.R.R.M. 3198], upholding the
CAB approval of a merger of Lake Central Airlines into Allegheny Airlines, which found such
merger to be consistent with the public interest pursuant to the merger provisions of the Federal
Aviation Act § 408, 72 Stat. 767 (1958), as amended, 74 Stat. 901, 49 U.S.C. S 1378(a) (1),
without requiring assumption of a collective bargaining contract with a union (ALEA) covering
some of the employees of Lake Central. Agreeing with the CAB, the court held: "Insofar as any
dispute existed over the representational rights of ALEA with respect to some or all of the passenger
service employees in the merged unit, such a dispute was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Meditation Board under section 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act. Insofar as there
was a dispute over the possible survival of some terms of the ALEA-Lake Central collective agree-
ment, based upon principles of the law of contracts generally or of labor contracts in particular,
such a dispute could be resolved by suit in an appropriate court." [71 L.R.R.M. at 2200.].77 ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., 36 C.A.B. 430 .(1962).
"s ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., 7 Av. Cas. 17,936 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
"'ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., 36 C.A.B. 430, at 465-67.
s" Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964),
amending 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
"x "Unfair labor practice" carries little stigma and perhaps should be discarded in favor of a
stronger and more accurate expression, such as "unlawful labor practice." Compare "unlawful
employment practice" used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000 et seq.
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require compliance, the Board must seek and obtain enforcement through
a review proceeding in a United States court of appeals."2 In an unfair
labor practice proceeding the Board may, but rarely does, petition a federal
district court for temporary injunctive relief under section 10 (j) pend-
ing final determination of the case by the Board. (3) Section 10(k) of
the Act empowers and directs the Board to hear and determine "jurisdic-
tional disputes" among competing unions whenever charges are filed under
section 8 (b) (4) (d) alleging a strike or withholding of service, or a
threat to that effect, relating to disputed work assignments."
b. General Counsel-Since 1947 the position of General Counsel has
been independent of the NLRB. The General Counsel's office is responsible
for the investigation of unfair labor practice charges, the issuance of un-
fair labor practice complaints and the prosecution of these complaint cases
before the Board.' There is no appeal from the refusal of the General
Council to issue a complaint." In secondary boycott and organizational
or recognitional picketing cases, when the officer or regional attorney to
whom the case is assigned by the General Counsel has reasonable cause to
believe that a complaint should issue, section 10 (1) requires that he peti-
tion a United States district court for temporary injunctive relief pending
NLRB action on the complaint."7 The Regional Directors, who operate
under the General Counsel, also participate in processing and deciding
representation cases. "
c. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)-The function
of the FMCS is to assist parties in the settlement of labor disputes through
conciliation and mediation.8" When requested by employers and unions,
the FMCS also furnishes panels of neutral arbitrators from which arbi-
trators may be selected to hear and determine arbitration cases.'*
d. Voluntary Arbitration-The chief forum for the interpretation and
application of collective bargaining agreements is private, voluntary arbi-
tration. Unlike the adjustment board procedures of the Railway Labor
82 Section 10(e), 48 Stat. 426, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 5 160(c) (1959).
85Labor-Management Relations Act, § 10(j), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
5 160(j) (1964), amending 49 Stat. 446 (1935).
84See NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs, Local 1212 (CBS), 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
Id. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (D), 160(k).
' National Labor Relations Act § 3(d), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29
U.S.C. § 153(d) (1964).
8 See RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 5 102.19.
"
7 Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1)
(1964), amending 49 Stat. 446 (1935).
88National Labor Relations Act § 3(b), 49 Star. 453 (1935), as amended, 73 Stat. 544, 29
U.S.C. 5 153(b) (1964). See RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, § 102.67.
89Labor-Management Relations Act § 201-05, 61 Stat. 153, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-75
(1964), amending 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
90"It is the policy of the United States that . . . the settlement of issues between employers
and employees through collective bargaining may be advanced by making available full and adequate
governmental facilities for conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration to aid and encourage
employers and the representatives of their employees to reach and maintain agreements concerning
rates of pay, hours, and working conditions, and to make all reasonable efforts to settle their differ-
ences by mutual agreement reached through conferences and collective bargaining or by such
methods as may be provided for in any applicable agreement for the settlement of disputes. ....
Labor-Management Relations Act § 201 (b), 61 Stat. 153, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 171 (b) (1964),
amending 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
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Act, arbitration of contract disputes under Taft-Hartley is not compul-
sory. However, the statute favors arbitration,9' and the courts indulge
every reasonable presumption to find arbitration coverage when the par-
ties have included an arbitration clause in their contract."2 Approximately
94 per cent of all collective bargaining contracts contain arbitration
clauses. 3
e. Federal District Courts-(1)One of the most significant areas of
labor law jurisdiction assigned to the federal courts is the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements pursuant to section 301 of LMRA. Fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Lincoln Mills," section
301 became the platform for the establishment of a comprehensive system
of arbitration law. Section 301 also provides a federal forum for damage
suits for breach of collective bargaining agreements.95 However, it does
not provide for injunctive relief against a strike in violation of a no-strike
clause.' (2) The federal district courts also exercise jurisdiction in fair
representation cases against unions," and employers may be joined in
such actions under section 301.": (3) As previously noted, the federal
district courts are given specific jurisdiction under section 10(j) and
10(1) to grant interim injunctive relief in certain types of unfair labor
practice cases. Private parties, however, may not invoke the district court's
jurisdiction under Taft-Hartley,9 except in rare instances against the
NLRB itself, where the Board is exceeding its statutory authority' ° and
there is no factual issue to be determined by the Board.'9 ' (4) The federal
district courts are also empowered to issue limited injunctions in emergency
disputes which imperil the national health or safety."° (5) Section 303
of the Act grants the district courts jurisdiction to entertain private dam-
age suits for secondary boycotts which violate section 8 (b) (4) of the
Act."° (6) Section 302 of Taft-Hartley, which restricts payments by
employers to employee representatives, is enforceable in the federal courts. °'0
f. State Courts-State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal
91 Id.
92 Teamsters Local No. 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); United Steel Wkrs. v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel Wkrs. v. American Manu-
facturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
"2 U.S. BuR. OF LAB. STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LAB., BULL. No. 1425-6, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING AGREEMENTS: ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 5 (1966).
94 Textile Wkrs. Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
'5Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
" Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). Supra note 70.
"
7Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
98 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171. Employers may not be joined in such actions before the NLRB.
Cf. Local 485, Int'l Union of Electrical Wkrs. (Automotive Plating Corp.), 170 N.L.R.B. No. 121
(1968).
"
5 Bakery Sales Drivers, Local 33 v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948). See also Amazon Cotton
Mill Co. v. Textile Wkrs., 167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948).
'
0
°Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
'1 Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
"'°Labor-Management Relations Act §§ 206-09, 61 Stat. 155 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 176-79 (1964), amending 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
"'United Brick and Clay Wkrs. v. Deena Artware, 198 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 897 (1952); Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952).
'OtLabor-Management Relations Act, 61 Star. 157, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1964),
amending 49 Stat. 452 (1935). E.g., U.S. v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299 (1956).
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district courts in contract actions under section 301... and in secondary
boycott damage suits under section 303.' Also, under various exceptions
to the doctrine of federal preemption, state tribunals may coexist with
the NLRB in the regulation of certain areas of conduct which touch
interests that are "deeply rooted in local feeling,"'0 ' such as torts involving
violence,' or where the activity regulated is of "merely peripheral con-
cern of the Labor-Management Relations Act,'0 9 such as suits for rein-
statement of union membership rights."'
These are the six tribunals and agencies which share original jurisdiction
over matters regulated by the Labor-Management Relations Act.
III. SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS
The multiplicity of tribunals and agencies which I have described-
twelve varieties with assorted amounts of original jurisdiction over diverse
aspects of labor relations-has produced, as one might expect, a sizable
jurisprudence devoted exclusively to the subject of overlapping and con-
flicting jurisdiction."' Extensive judicial"' and scholarly". efforts over the
"°sTeamsters Local 174 v. Lucus Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
06 The specific language of § 303 (b)--"any other court having jurisdiction of the parties"-
confers jurisdiction on the state courts [29 U.S.C. § 187]; however, state courts must apply federal
law. Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964); cf. United Mine Wkrs. v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715 (1966).
'San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 238 (1959).
"' United Auto Wkrs. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355
U.S. 131 (1957); United Construction Wkrs. v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
109359 U.S. at 236, 238 (1959).
110 AM v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). In Linn v. United Plant Guard Wkrs., 383 U.S.
53, 61 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the exercise of state jurisdiction in a libel action
would be a "'merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act,' provided it is
limited to redressing libel issued with knowledge of its falsity, or with reckless disregard of whether
it was true or false."
".. Examples of scholarly comment on the subject include the following: Aaron, Judicial Inter-
vention in Labor Arbitration, 20 STAN. L. REV. 41 (1967); Beeson, Boundaries of State-Federal
Jurisdiction in Labor-Management Relations Under the New Labor Law-A Federal View, N.Y.U.
THIRTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 51 (1960); Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor
Relations, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297 (1954); Currier, Defamation in Labor Disputes: Preemption
and the New Federal Common Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 1 (1967); Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of
Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional Problems, 57 COL. L. REv. 52 (1957); Feinsinger, Federal-
State Relations Under the Taft-Hartley Act, N.Y.U. FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR
LAW 463 (1948); Hays, Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA. L. REV.
959 (1954); Howlett, The Arbitrator, the N.L.R.B. and the Courts, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING 67 (1967); Meltzer, The
Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 59 COL. L. REV. 6 (1959);
McCoid, State Regulations of Labor-Management Relations: The Import of Garmon and Landrum-
Griffin, 48 IOWA L. REV. 578 (1963); Peck, Accommodation and Conflict Among Tribunals:
Whatever happened to preemption? SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS-1969, 121 (1969); Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State jurisdiction Over Labor
Relations, 46 MICH. L. R. 593 (1948); Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the
NLRB, 76 HAR~'. L. REv. 529 (1963); Summers, Pre-emption and the Labor Reform Act-Dual
Rights and Remedies, 22 OHIO ST. L. R. 119 (1961); Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise
to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 471 (1962); Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 U.
OHIO L. REV. 542 (1959); Wollett, The Agreement and the National Labor Relations Act: Courts,
Arbitrators and the NLRB-Who Decides What?, 14 LAB. L.J. 1041 (1963).
11E.g., NLRB v. Strong Roofing & Insulating Co., 393 U.S. 357 (1969); Bhd. of R.R. Train-
men v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967);
NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); Transportation-Communication Employees
Union v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157 (1966); Linn v. Plant Guard Wkrs. Local 114,
383 U.S. S3 (1966); Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963); Smith v. Evening Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Bhd.
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last quarter of a century have failed to reconcile the jurisdictional func-
tions of these tribunals. In fact, the changing role of collective bargaining
as an institution seems to have accelerated the conflict. For example, an
increasing number of legal disputes now occur in the context of established
patterns of collective bargaining--disputes which typically involve, di-
rectly or indirectly, grievances relating to contract interpretation and/or
fair representation."' At present no single tribunal under either the RLA
or the LMRA can effectively grant all of the relief required to settle many
of these disputes. Writing new substantive laws will not solve the problem.
However, procedural reform designed to coordinate enforcement of re-
lated laws could alleviate the worst aspects. Since our "horse-and-buggy"
jurisprudence was not designed for the settlement of "jet age" labor dis-
putes, there is an urgent need to develop more efficient methods of ad-
ministration and to devise tribunals which will be better equipped, by
structure and direction, to interpret and enforce the basic labor laws.
The various tribunals under the present statutes have too often proven
their impotence in the performance of their jurisdictional tasks. The prob-
lems which they have developed will therefore be reviewed preliminary to
an examination of proposed changes.
A. Problems Under The RLA
The scope of this paper does not permit a detailed recital of all of the
recognized problems of administration and statutory interpretation that
currently plague airline and railway labor relations. However, an attempt
will be made to list the major trouble spots which may be traceable to the
structural weakness inherent in the multiplicity of tribunals operating
under the Railway Labor Act:
(1) The NMB has failed to establish realistic bargaining units, par-
ticularly in the airline industry, although it has ample discretion to do so
under the broad statutory mandate contained in the phrase "craft or class."
This discretion was fully reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the ABNE
llS
case.
(2) There is an absence of sufficient NMB hearing procedures in repre-
sentation cases; particularly, there is insufficient opportunity for adequate
presentation of the carrier's position and evidence in individual cases in-
volving craft or class determination."'
of Locomotive Engineers v. M-K-T R.R. Co., 363 528 (1960); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958);
United Automobile Wkrs. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Guss v. Utah Labor Rel. Bd. 353
U.S. 1 (1957); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 485
(1953); Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943);
Allen Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
11s Supra note 111.
14 E.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967); NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d
682 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969); Rubber Wkrs., Local 12 v. NLRB, 368
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Local 485, Int'l Union of Elec.
Wkrs. (Automotive Plating Corp.), 170 N.L.R.B. 121 (1968).
" Bhd. of Ry. & Steamship Clerks v. Ass'n for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380
U.S. 650 (1965).
"1 See McLaughlin, Rx for the Airline Industry: Change the Railway Labor Act, 53 A.B.A.J.
37, 39 (1937).
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(3) The NMB lacks adequate administrative machinery for the con-
duct of elections and resolution of disputes relating to elections. Recent
cases1. illustrate these inadequacies.
(4) There is conflicting authority between the respective functions of
the NMB and the various adjustment boards in the determination of inter-
union jurisdictional disputesY"
(5) The NMB has failed to provide a means for decertification of em-
ployee representatives." 9
(6) The NMB has also failed to provide an adequate "no" vote on the
ballot it uses in representation elections."'
(7) There is a lack of uniformity in judicial enforcement and interpre-
tation-the inevitable result of the scattering of decision-making respon-
sibility among hundreds of federal district judges in courts of general
jurisdiction. The absence at the trial court level of a concentration of
judicial experience and specialization in the law of the Railway Labor Act
impedes proper comprehension and efficient enforcement of a complex
statute. 12
117 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Bhd. of Ry. & Airline Clerks and National Mediation Bd., 402
F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 848 (1968). Cf. Pan Am World Airways v.
Teamsters, 275 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) and Bhd. of Ry. Clerks v. National Mediation Bd.,
374 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Zantop Air Transport Corp., 394 F.2d
36 (6th Cir. 1968); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Braniff Airways, Inc., - F.2d - (D.D.C. 1969)
[70 L.R.R.M. 3333].
.1. Compare Switchmen's Union of N. America v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297
(1943), and Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pacific R.R., 385 U.S.
157 (1966). See Railroad Signalmen v. Southern Ry., 380 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1967). In Transporta-
tion-Communications Employee's Union v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, (1966), the Su-
preme Court said that "[t]here are two kinds of jurisdictional disputes .... The ordinary jurisdic-
tional dispute arises when two or more unions claim the right to perform a job which existed at the
time their collective bargaining contracts with the employer were made. . . .But the dispute before
us now is not the ordinary jurisdictional dispute. . . .Here, though two jobs existed when the col-
lective bargaining agreements were made . . . automation has now resulted in there being only onejob, a job which is different from either of the former jobs and which was not expressly contracted
to either' of the unions. . . .The railroad, the employees, and the public . . . are entitled to have
a fair, expeditious hearing to settle disputes of this nature. And the Adjustment Board has juris-
diction to do so," citing Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946), and Slocum v. Dela-
ware. L & W.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239 (1950). In Firemen v. Louisville R.R. the Sixth Circuit said that
"[t]he rule is plain: Jurisdictional disputes between labor organizations governed by the Railway
Labor Act are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board." To the District
Court in the Southern District of New York the "exercise" by the Board [NRAB] of its exclusivejurisdiction to settle disputes like this in a single proceeding with all disputant unions present was
also clear. See also the recent Fifth Circuit decision in Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers
v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 413 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1969), which further illustrated the complex
problem. At issue was a tripartite dispute which followed the merger of the Seaboard Air Line Ry.
and the Atlantic Coast Line R.R. into the Seaboard Coast Line R.R. It involved the effect to be
given certain tripartite agreements executed by the Locomotive Engineers, the Locomotive Firemen
and the former Atlantic Coast Line R.R. The Fifth Circuit found the problem to be jurisdictional
between competing unions; consequently only the NMB would have jurisdiction to resolve the
dispute. Dissenting vigorously, Judge Thornberg saw the problem as one requiring exercise of courtjurisdiction to enforce the bargaining requirements of § 6 of the statute.
"'See McLaughlin, supra note 116 at 41. Cf. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Bhd. of Ry. & Airline
Clerks and NMB, 402 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1968) [169 L.R.R.M.
24351.52
°Bhd. of Ry. & Steamship Clerks v. Ass'n for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380
U.S. 650 (1965). McLaughlin, su/ira note 116 at 30.
... The Railway Labor Act was written for-and largely by-railroads and unions in an in-
dustry where labor organizations were already fully established (supra note 49). In fact, the
language of the statute almost assumes the existence of unions on every property, e.g., S 2, First,
45 U.S.C. § 152. Thus, the success of the 1926 and 1934 Acts depended largely on voluntary
compliance by the parties. In 1936, however, when Title II added coverage of the airlines, airline
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(8) There is a need for an agency or officer, like the General Counsel
of the NLRB, charged with prosecution of cases arising under the sub-
stantive provisions of the statute. It is believed that this defect in the
administrative scheme has resulted in effective denial of employee rights,
particularly in cases involving enforcement of a union's duty of fair
representation."
(9) The absence of a clear determination as to the division of authority
between the courts and the NMB over who will determine and remedy
statutory violations relating to elections impairs the exercise of employee
freedom of choice in representation cases."'
(10) The decisions are greatly in conflict as to the proper distinction
between major and minor disputes. The conflict as to the scope of ad-
justment board jurisdiction in the minor dispute cases frustrates the expedi-
tious determination of many of these disputes. Confusing questions there-
fore arise: Is the adjustment board's jurisdiction exclusive or only pri-
mary?" To what extent may a court interpret a collective bargaining
employees, with the exception of pilots, were not organized into unions. See Frankel, Airline Labor
Policy, the Stepchild of the Railway Labor Act, 18 J. AIR LAW & COM. 461 (1951). Today, new
labor problems exist among both railroads and airlines; however, no single tribunal is available to
give consistency and direction to the interpretation of broad, general language in the statute. The
Supreme Court, as indicated by the considerable size of its annual docket of RLA cases, has tried
to fill the role. Obviously, it can provide little guidance in this area for it must ration grants of
certiorari according to other considerations.
.a. The only machinery ordinarily available to redress RLA statutory violations in the nature
of "unfair labor practices" is the federal district court. But see supra notes 72-76 and infra note
128. The judicial process is unwieldy, excessively time-consuming and expensive. For example, a
period of six years was required to obtain reinstatement and back pay for locked out pilots in the
AAXICO case (infra note 128); and the Galveston Wharves dispute (supra note 66) began five
years ago and is apparently still bouncing between the district court and the court of appeals. Em-
ployees who have allegedly been discriminated against by unions must file and prosecute their own
actions, and most are probably never filed. Of the few which reach the courts, on a clear day they
can be seen forever. E.g., Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969); 35 J. AiR L. & CoM. - (1969), was 12 years in litigation. Cf.
Gunther v. San Diego & Arizona Eastern Ry. Co., 382 U.S. 257 (1965). Nor can an employee
allegedly discharged for union activity look to his uncertified union to represent him in court. The
Sixth Circuit, in Int'l Blid. of Teamsters v. Zantop Air Transport Corp., 394 F.2d 36 (6th Cir.
1968), has held that an "uncertified labor organization may not seek judicial enforcement of
a statutory provision guaranteeing the right of employees to organize and select a bargaining
representative ... ."
" See Comment, Procedure and Judicial Review under Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor
Act, 32 J. Ass LAw & COM. 249, 254-55 (1966). Despite the long-standing mandate of the Su-
preme Court authorizing district court jurisdiction to enforce statutory duties under the RLA
(Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937)), the Sixth Circuit recently
held that a petitioning union seeking NMB certification could not seek judicial redress of statutory
violations affecting employee choice of bargaining representative. It stated "that Congress . . . has
vested exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes in the National Mediation Board and that no juris-
diction lies in the Federal Courts until the remedies set forth in the Act have been fully exhaust-
ed." The NMB, however, has neither stretched its jurisdiction under § 2, Ninth to the point of
ordering reinstatement of employees discriminated against for union activities, nor required an em-
ployer to cease and desist from granting unlawful assistance to a labor organization in violation of
§ 2, Fourth. Indeed, there would be due process considerations as to any such actions, in view of
the employer's non-party status in representation proceedings under § 2, Ninth. Cf. Bhd. of Ry.
& S.S. Clerks v. Ass'n for Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965).
14 E.g., compare Railroad Yardmasters, 328 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1965), with United Indus.
Wkrs. v. Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1965). See discussion in Harper,
Major Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J. AiR L. & CoM. 3, 12-27 (1969). Numerous
cases illustrate the difficulty in applying the proper label, e.g., Locomotive Firemen v. Elgin Ry.,
404 F.2d 80 (7th Cir. 1968); Fla. E. Coast Ry. v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172 (5th
Cir), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1964); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
320 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1963); Shore Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen, 401 F.2d 368
(6th Cir. 1968).
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agreement for purposes of finding a violation of a statutory duty?125 In
the absence of a single decisional authority other than the Supreme Court,
the answers to these questions are slow in coming.
(11) The mingling, within the same agency, of the NMB's informal
role in mediating disputes and its quasi-adjudicatory role of determining
questions concerning employee representation hinders fulfillment of both
roles. 2 '
(12) The cumbersome ritualism of inflexible statutory procedures con-
tributes to delays in effective collective bargaining." '
As a conclusion to this recital of problems, it can be observed that in
RLA cases it is commonplace to find vast confusion concerning how the
issues will be decided and which tribunal will ultimately have the authority
to decide them. For example, in the ALPA-AAXICO"5 dispute, which
lasted six years, the case was tossed back and forth among a federal dis-
trict court, a system board of adjustment, the NMB, the CAB and two
circuit courts of appeals. It was like the game children play: "Button,
button, who's got the button?" Only under the Railway Labor Act it is
jurisdiction, not a button, that is elusive.
There are many such examples, but this survey is only preliminary and
I also wish to describe some of the Taft-Hartley problems which are as
serious as anything offered by the Railway Labor Act.
B. Problems Under The LMRA
Most procedural problems under the Taft-Hartley Act are of a differ-
ent nature, though some are also traceable to conflicts among multiple
tribunals. The main problem areas are the following:
(1) There is tendency for many of the key rulings of the NLRB to
swing back and forth, reflecting changes in national political adminis-
trations."9 The uncertainty in the law engendered by this phenomenon
"' See, Bhd. Locomotive Engineers v. M-K-T R.R. 363 U.S. 528, 531 (1960); Local Lodge
2144, Railway Clerks v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1969) [70 L.R.R.M.
3295]; supra note 69.
"I For a description of the Board's function in the two types of cases, see discussion in THIRTY-
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, 1956, at 26-35. See Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists v. National Mediation Bd., - F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1969), [71 L.R.R.M. 3161], which
required the NMB to discontinue mediation in an IAM-National Airlines dispute following 48 medi-
ation sessions which involved 179 hours of talk, after which 97 issues remained unresolved.
"" Railway Labor Act §§ 5, 6, and 10, 44 Stat. 580, 586 (1926), as amended, 63 Stat. 107, 48
Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155, 156, and 160 (1964). See Levisson, The Locomotive Firemen's Dispute,
17 LA1s. L.J. 671 (1966). Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen v. Louisville R.R., 400 F.2d 572 (6th Cir.
1969); System Federation v. Pa. Ry., 289 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
... AAXICO Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 331 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 933 (1964); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 360 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir.
1966); AAXICO Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 358 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966);
AAXICO Airlines, Inc. and Air Line Pilots Ass'n (Platt, System Bd. of Adjustment Award, 47
LA 289 (1966)).
129 Examples from the "Kennedy" Board include the following decisions: Smitley, d/b/a Crown
Cafeteria, 130 N.L.R.B. 1183, aff'd, 327 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1964); Bernal Foam Products Co., 146
N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964), overruling Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954) (which had
overruled an earlier Board decision in M.H. Davidson Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 142 (1951)); Town &
Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), overruling Brown-Dunkin Co., 125 N.L.R.B.
1379 (1959); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, modified, 138 N.L.R.B. 550,
enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). Examples of "Eisenhower"
Board decisions which changed "Truman" Board decisions include the following: B. V. D., 110
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makes voluntary acceptance of the Board's decisions harder to achieve.
This is not a criticism of individual members of the Board, but rather of
the system of five-year terms which has made such periodic decisional
changes almost inevitable.
All of the criticisms of the Board on this score have a familiar ring.
For example this statement:
[T]he pattern of .. . decisions by the NLRB has given rise to a serious con-
cern that policies laid down by Congress, in the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-
Griffin Acts, are being distorted and frustrated, to say the very least. (Con-
gressman Robert Griffin in 1962.)'30
One might also recall the following charge:
[T]he new NLRB-manned suddenly by a majority made up of three new
appointees-has proceeded to "reinterpret" the Act in such manner as to
change its practical application substantially beyond anything seriously con-
sidered in recent Congresses."'
This statement could have been a typical charge leveled against the NLRB
by a spokesman for the National Association of Manufacturers during the
early years of the Kennedy administration; yet, the quotation was from
an article by Professor Willard Wirtz in 1954, during the Eisenhower
administration.
Here is another comment:
[T]he Taft-Hartley Act has been changed, and changed drastically. But the
change has not been made by the Congress. It has been made by the Eisen-
hower appointees to the National Labor Relations Board. Sworn to uphold
the law which Congress enacted, it would seem that they have searched it
from stem to stern with the purpose of making it a more antilabor statute,
and of reversing every possible rule of interpretation and application estab-
lished in administration of the Act from 1947 through 1952. (Senator
Wayne Morse, 1956) ."
We tend to forget. Perhaps union spokesmen and others favoring retention
of the status quo have forgotten that the pendulum swings both ways.
(2) After 34 years, the National Labor Relations Act still requires
N.L.R.B. 1412 (1954); Terry Poulrty Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1954); McAllister Transfer, 110
N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954); Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Wks., 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953). See
generally, Hearings on Congressional Oversight of Administrative Agencies (NLRB) before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary (Ervin Committee), U.S. Sen-
ate, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1 and 2 (1968).
"0 114 CONo. REC. 50 (1968) (restated by Congressman Griffin in a recent statement before
the Senate). Numerous such charges were levied against the Board during the recent Ervin Com-
mittee hearings, supra note 129. E.g., Leonard S. Janofsky, representing the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, stated: "What alarms the business community is that the NLRB restructures the Fed-
eral labor law to coincide with the political and socioeconomic predilections respecting industrial
relations of those indivdual members who happen to constitute a majority of the Board at any
particular time." Id. at 356. Gerard D. Reilly, former NLRB member, noted that the Board as
created by Congress is essentially a court, for unlike other independent agencies vested with
quasi-legislative powers, Congress did not entrust the Board with policymaking authority." Id.
at 432. He cited several instances to illustrate 'how the present Board has disregarded congressional
intent and cast aside guiding precedent, . . . a series of decisions which have virtually restructured
the whole foundation of bargaining in certain industries." Id. at 433.
sas Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations Board; Herein of "Employer Persuasion," 49
Nw. U. L. REV. 594 (1954).
13' 102 CONG. REc. 5454-5489 (1956) (speech of Senator Wayne Morse).
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vigorous enforcement. Voluntary acceptance and compliance have not
been achieved to the extent necessary for successful execution of the na-
tional labor policy. The recently issued Thompson Report in the House of
Representatives on the effectiveness of National Labor Relations Act
remedies found:
[a] regrettable unwillingness on the part of some to accept the basic tenets
of the National Labor Relations Act. The national labor policy still meets
determined challenge and resistance in some quarters. The caseload of
meritorious "unlawful discharge" cases has doubled in the past eight years,
suggesting a willful flouting of the national policy as enacted into law more
than 30 years ago.3 '
(3) The Board's process is too slow for effective administration. The
Thompson Report concluded that "[e]mployers who violate the law are
encouraged to do so as the penalties come too late for effective enforce-
ment, and in any event have little or no deterrent force."'"M The situation
is no better today than it was in 1960 when a blue-ribbon Senatorial Ad-
visory Panel on Labor-Management Relations Law concluded that:
A major weakness in the labor-management relations law is the long delay in
contested NLRB proceedings. . . . In labor-management relations justice
delayed is often justice denied. A remedy granted more than two years after
the event will bear little relation to the human situation which gave rise to
the need for governmental intervention.'
(4) Except for section 10 (1), which provides for mandatory injunc-
tions against unions that engage in secondary boycotts and organizational
or recognitional picketing, the NLRA provides no adequate means for
obtaining quick and sure equitable relief to protect the rights which it
guarantees. The Thompson Committee found this deficiency to be critical:
A growing body of evidence indicates that the freedom of choice guaranteed
by Congress-to join a union or to refrain from so doing-has not worked
well in practice. An increasing number of employees, approximately 15,000
a year, presently are being discharged because they join a union, or refuse to
do so.
Not only do employers in increasing number flout and ignore the provisions
of section 8(a) (3); there is further evidence that the administrative and
judicial delay in processing these cases vitiates any effective redress-economic
pressures force these discharged employees to forego their right to reinstate-
ment in exchange for a partial "back-pay" award.
Some employers are willing to pay even more than the "back-pay" to rid
their plants of union leaders; and the "chilling" effect of this callous tactic
on the rank-and-file strikes at the very heart and purpose of the national
labor policy to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing.
136
1' NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT REMEDIES: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE, REPORT OF
SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON LAB., COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LAB., COMM. PRINTS, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., 1 (1968).
1
34 Id. at 2.
135 ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, REPORT OF
ADVISORY PANEL ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS LAW TO THE SENATE COMM. ON LAB. AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, S. Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., (1960).
13OSupra note 133 at 5.
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(5) There is a serious conflict in jurisdiction between the NLRB and
the arbitration process-just as there is a conflict between the NLRB and
court jurisdiction under section 301."' The Board has no jurisdiction as
such to interpret or enforce collective bargaining agreements;" that is
the business of arbitrators and courts under section 301. Likewise, the
courts have no jurisdiction to determine unfair labor practices; that is the
Board's function.13 But the line which separates violations of collective
agreements from unfair labor practices that involve the interpretation of
such agreements is often difficult to find. And when it is found, the result
may be the application of an inadequate remedy by a tribunal which may
have jurisdiction in a technical sense but lacks the outlook and means in
a practical sense to achieve a meaningful solution to the underlying dis-
pute. It is true that the Board has authority to interpret collective bar-
gaining contracts to the extent necessary for the determination of unfair
labor practices;"" however, the interpretation of labor agreements is nor-
mally the function of arbitrators, subject only to limited judicial review
under the familiar doctrine of the Steelworker Trilogy.' When the Board
invades this contractual relationship, it is often ill-equipped to prescribe
"" See Bond, The Concurrance Conundrum: The Overlapping Jurisdiction, 42 S. CAL. L. RE. 212
(1968); Hanley, The NLRB and the Arbitartion Process: Conflict or Accommodation? in SOuTH-
WESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS-1968, 151 (1968); Peck, Accommoda-
tion and Conflict Among Tribunals: Whatever Happened to Preemption? in SOUmTWESTERN LEGAL
FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOP'MENTS---1969, 121 (1969); Sovern, Section 301 and the Pri-
mary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1963); Wollett, The Agreement and the
National Labor Relations Act: Courts, Arbitrators and the NLRB-Who Decides What?, 14 LAB.
L.J. 1041 (1963).
138 In 1947 Congress rejected a bill which would have given the NLRB unfair labor practice
jurisdiction over breaches of collective bargaining agreements. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., §§
8(a) (6) and 8(b) (5) (1947); 1 LEGis. HIST. OF LMRA 109-11, 114. See NLRB v. C & C Ply-
wood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 427, n.ll. In the adoption of § 301, the House Conferees asserted:
"Once parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract should
be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the National Labor Relations Board." H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 42 (1947).
s'San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See also Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), and Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261,
272 (1964), where the Supreme Court said that "[s]hould the Board disagree with the arbiter
... the Board's ruling would, of course, take precedence and if the employer's action had been in
accord with that ruling, it would not be liable for damages under § 301." However, the Board will
recognize an arbitrator's award when it finds that "the proceedings appear to have been fair and
regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly
repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act." Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082
(1955). See also Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964); Raley's, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 256
(1963); International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962) affirmed sub nom., Ramsey v.
NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
'
40 NLRB v. Strong, d/b/a Strong Roofing Co., 393 U.S. 357 (1969); Acme Industrial Co.,
385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). The overlap of NLRA and § 301 jurisdiction was painfully
apparent in the C & C Plywood case. The Board construed a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement in which the employer had reserved the right to pay premium wage rates to reward
particular employees for "some special fitness, skill, aptitude or the like." The Supreme Court
affirmed the Board's construction that this clause did not authorize unilateral promulgation of an
incentive rate for "glue spreader" crews; therefore, the employer was guilty of a refusal to bargain.
The case may have paved the way for further NLRB encroachment into cass involving ordinary
violations of collective bargaining contracts. The potential for conflict between Board determination
and judicial action or arbitration (albeit there was no arbitration clause in the C & C Plywood con-
tract) should be obvious.
"'1United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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an appropriate or complete remedy, and when it acts, it may be doing so
at the expense of the arbitration process.1
(6) This conflict with arbitration is particularly apparent in the bur-
geoning area of fair representation-a field of law which has become in-
creasingly important now that collective bargaining has achieved greater
stability, and union representation has become more institutionalized. Un-
der the Taft-Hartley Act, neither a court nor the NLRB possesses suffi-
cient processes, or has the requisite jurisdiction over parties, subject matter
and remedies, to grant complete relief in many of these cases." According
to the Supreme Court's Vaca'" decision, courts may be allowed to fashion
more appropriate relief than the Board in cases involving both the em-
ployer and the union. However, the necessity of the employee bringing
his own action through his own attorney seriously impairs the effectiveness
of a purely judicial remedy, just as it does under the Railway Labor Act.14
On the other hand, if the aggrieved employee chooses to file a charge
with the Board, the General Counsel investigates the case and prosecutes
it if it merits issuance of a complaint. But, unless the employer has con-
spired with the union or has acted in response to union pressure, there is
no way for the Board to assume jurisdiction over the employer,14 and,
consequently, a complete remedy, which might require reinstatement of
a discharged employee by the employer, may not be achieved. This defect
is critical when an employee has been discharged for what the employer
deems sufficient cause under the bargaining contract, and where the union,
in breach of its duty of fair representation, fails to provide proper repre-
sentation or arbitration. 41 There is an obvious need for a procedure which
will wed the administrative and judicial processes; one which will permit a
142 "Arbitration is not a process which the Board is either equipped or qualified to follow. Those
who are arbiters have special qualifications in a particular industry and come to know the common
law of the shop . . . . What the 'common law' of the shop would show covering these . . . benefits,
what past practices might reflect on the amount of an award . . . no one knows. These are matters
for arbiters, chosen by the parties under the collective bargaining agreement, not for the Board, an
alien to the system envisioned by Lincoln Mills." Strong v. NLRB, 393 U.S. 357, 364 (1969)
(dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.). Board Member Brown, concurring in Adams Dairy Co., 147
N.L.R.B. 1410, 1423 (1964), declared: "While it is possible that a party may concurrently pursue
both the arbitration and the unfair labor practice routes, I believe that it is inconsistent with the
statutory policy favoring arbitration for the Board to resolve disputes which, while cast as unfair
labor practices, essentially involve a dispute with respect to the interpretation or application of the
collective-bargaining agreement."
143 Compare Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) and Int'l Union of Elec. Wkrs., Local 485
[Automotive Plating Corp.], 170 N.L.R.B. 121 (1968). While the Court route lacks the as-
sistance of the office of General Counsel, the Board route lacks the necessary parties. In Automotive
Plating the union was found guilty of breach of its duty of fair representation in violation of §
8(b) (1) (A) because of its refusal to process the grievance of a discharged employee. The em-
ployer, who was not a party to the action, maintained that the discharge was for cause under the
collective bargaining agreement. Although the Board acknowledged that it was not foreclosed from
construing the agreement, it wisely refrained from doing so, and instead remanded the case, re-
taining jurisdiction, and ordered the union "to request the Company to reconsider the matter . . .
and if necessary take the case to arbitration .. " [Emphasis added.]. If the company wished
to treat the discharge as final, the Board would obviously be powerless to require either arbitration
or reinstatement.
144Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
145Supra note 122 and accompanying text.
14 National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a) (I) and 8(a) (3), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended,
61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and 158(a)(3) (1964).
147 See Automotive Plating Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 121 (1968); supra note 143 and accompanying
text.
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joinder of claims and parties ' " in a combination unfair labor practice and
section 301 action.
(7) The Board's decisional process is unwieldy and inefficient. William
Murphy, drawing on his recent experience as a professor in residence with
the Board, observed that "the problem of delay is most acute at the Board
level. 1. 9 He had reference in particular to institutional delays caused, in
large measure, by the duplication of staff work and the anonymity of
the Board's decisional process."i
(8) The failure of the Board to make pre-trial discovery available to
the parties complicates litigation and discourages settlements."'
(9) The absence of any appeal from the refusal of the General Counsel
to issue a complaint centers excessive authority in one man."'
(10) The structure of the Act encourages inordinate resort to the
appellate process. For example, in 1966, 64 percent of the Board decisions
were appealed.' The absence of self-enforcing orders requires the Board
to obtain appellate review in many cases where an appeal might otherwise
not be taken if the aggrieved party were required to take his appeal in
the manner customary in ordinary civil court actions.
Thus, in the jargon of Madison Avenue, the NLRB has a "poor image."
The Board is not readily believed, it lacks the instant process necessary
to make the bulk of its orders meaningful, and it has become a whipping
boy for those who would prefer not to submit to the requirements of the
statute. As a result of this poor image and of the jurisdictional problems
inherent in the outmoded enforcement procedures of the statute, the labor
policy of the Labor-Management Relations Act falls far short of fulfill-
ment.
IV. A WORKING HYPOTHESIS FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM
The foregoing problems are traceable primarily to procedural weaknesses
in available enforcement machinery under both the Railway Labor Act and
the Labor-Management Relations Act. Although the procedural difficulties
under each statute are not the same, the underlying substantive law is
.
4SAs under the liberal joinder provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 18, 19. See also the joinder pro-
visions for the Court of Claims, U.S. CT. CL. RUsS 25, 26, and 27. Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and other modern codes of judicial practice, liberal joinder of claims and parties
is encouraged--and in many instances required-so that a single action may dispose of all facets of
a dispute among all parties concerned.
.. Murphy, The National Labor Relations Board-An Ablraisal, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL
FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS- -1968, 113, 139 (1968).
"lId. at 130-132.
1' Experience with the liberal discovery practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
demonstrates that settlement is more easily achieved when the element of surprise is removed from
a lawsuit and each side has access to pertinent evidence. Even when settlement is not achieved,
discovery reduces the issues in dispute and expedites the litigation process.
.. Under the National Labor Relations Act § 10(f), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61
Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964), only final orders of the NLRB are subject to judicial re-
view. Refusal by the General Counsel to issue a complaint is not a final order within the meaning
of § 10(f). Manhattan Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 302 (10th Cir. 1952); Teamsters Local
886 v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1950); Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306 (1st Cir. 1948).
" NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT REMEDIES: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE, REPORT OF
SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON LAB., COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LAB., COMM. PRINT, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., 40 (1968).
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sufficiently alike under both statutes to warrant development of a common
procedure. Though I do not wish to oversimplify either the problems or
their solutions, a good pragmatic basis for procedural reform does seem
to exist. The one area where organized labor, organized management and
so-called spokesmen for the public and for various segments of the public
might find it advantageous to work together for legislative reform is in
a program which leaves substantive law relatively unchanged, but concen-
trates on devising a simplified and more efficient means of enforcement and
administration. Ideally such a means should be applicable to both statutes."'
As was indicated at the beginning of this paper, the program which I
am suggesting should be considered only as a working hypothesis. Each
component must be tested and weighed. If there is merit in the suggested
approach, a great amount of study and revision will still be necessary.
Some of the tentative conclusions supporting the hypothesis are based on
experience and observation. Hard data, however, should be sought in
statistical studies and detailed analyses of case histories. Whether such data
will ultimately support the suggested plan, remove its underpinnings or
point toward the development of a procedural structure along wholly
different lines, remains to be seen.
A. General Structure
The complexities of the procedural problems under the existing laws
stem more from the inadequacy of outmoded enforcement machinery than
from complexity in the substantive law being administered. It would be
folly to try to achieve meaningful procedural reform by patchwork. There-
fore, the time has arrived for a bold, new approach-for establishment of
a functional structure designed especially for the unique institutions which
characterize labor relations in this country.
First, let us not be frightened by the tyranny of labels. I recommend
establishment of a labor court. Though the label "labor court" means
different things to different people, like Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty,
"[w]hen I use a word . .. it means just what I choose it to mean-neither
more nor less."' "H And I do not choose for "labor court" to mean merely
a legislative court substituted for the National Labor Relations Board;'.
nor do I intend it to be an Americanized version of any of the several
European labor courts which exist primarily to settle "rights" disputes.'57
In the United States such disputes concern the application and interpreta-
tion of collective bargaining contracts and, in general, are handled effec-
154 The procedures for enforcement of the RLA and the LMRA which are proposed herein could
conceivably be extended to other related statutes. E.g., the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1964); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964), The Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1964). A strong case can be made for their
inclusion; however, the limited scope of this preliminary study precludes an analysis of such possi-
bilities.
"m L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 247 (Modern Library ed.).
15 See S. 103, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (introduced by Senator Griffin).
157 See RAMM, The Structure and Function of Labor Courts, in DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PRO-
CEDURES IN FIVE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRrES 12 (B. Aaron ed. 1969), and Fleming, The
Labor Court Idea, 65 MiCH. L. REV. 1551 (1967).
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tively by voluntary arbitration and statutory boards of adjustment."' 5
Therefore, "labor court," as the term will be used herein, will mean a
constitutional court 59 with jurisdiction limited to enforcement of the
Labor-Management Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act. Further-
more, such a court would not exist in isolation; it would be part of a
general revision in procedure, the result of which would be a planned
coupling of the judicial and the administrative processes. Certain functions
in law enforcement can best be handled by the judiciary; however, the
administration of public laws, such as the ones involved herein, may also
require use of administrative agencies. The plan which follows will there-
fore attempt to allocate functions within the constitutional framework
respecting both the judicial and the legislative powers of the federal gov-
ernment.
The Supreme Court has recognized the right of Congress to establish a
constitutional court of specialized and limited jurisdiction."' In Glidden
v. Zdonok,61 the Court gave effect to an express congressional declaration
in the 1958 revision of the Judicial Code that the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals was "a court established under Article III. .. ."" The
Court stated that "Congress has never been compelled to vest the entire
jurisdiction provided for in Article III upon inferior courts of its crea-
tion.'.'. Thus, the way is now open for the creation of a specialized court
to do those things which a court can do more effectively than an adminis-
trative board. However, since successful administration of public laws such
as these must also depend upon agency action, certain administrative
machinery must be retained and modified. Specifically, a board can handle
questions concerning representation better than a court. Moreover, an
administrative general counsel, representing the public interest, should be
made available to prepare and present complaint cases which otherwise
would be inadequately handled by private litigation-if handled at all.
With these goals in mind, the following proposals are cautiously suggested.
A constitutional court, having jurisdiction over the enforcement of
substantive rights and duties contained in the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act and the Railway Labor Act, should be created. The court might
appropriately be called the United States Labor Court.
To supplement the court's judicial function, a new or revised adminis-
158 Supra 545 & 549. A caveat: Railroad adjustment board procedures in recent years have not
been particularly effective. However, the newly organized Public Law (PL) Boards may provide
improvement in the handling of,"minor disputes" of railroad employees. The NMB "anticipates
that Public Law (PL) Boards will eventually supplant the Special Board of Adjustment procedure,
which has been utilized by many representatives of carriers and employees by agreement over the
past 20 years, and also reduce the caseload of various divisions of the National Railroad Adjustment
Board." 34TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 44 (1968).
159 I.e., a court established under U.S. CoNsT. art. III.
... Glidden v. Zdonok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
161 Id.
1e 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1964). The same congressional declaration of intent was applicable to
the Court of Claims. See note 171, infra.
'63370 U.S. at $61. In Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S. 519 (1966), the Court reaffirmed the
Glidden analysis of the nature and status of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, holding
that a decision of the court "is that of an Article III court. It is 'judicial' in character ...
It is final and binding in the usual sense." 383 U.S. at 526.
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trative structure should be established. This could be accomplished by a
merger of the personnel and functions of three existing administrative
agencies into two new agencies: (1) The representation functions under
both the NLRA and the RLA would be combined for handling by a
single board which could be called the National Labor Representation
Board-a new NLRB. (2) The mediation functions of both the National
Mediation Board and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service would
be merged into a single mediation agency, which might be titled the Na-
tional Mediation Service-the NMS. The two new agencies could absorb
the personnel and membership of the existing agencies.
The office of General Counsel should be retained. Perhaps the position
should be renamed General Labor Counsel-a more accurate identification
of the function of the office. Under this proposal, the duties and respon-
sibilities of the office would be expanded to include authority to issue com-
plaints and to prosecute actions under the Railway Labor Act as well as
under the National Labor Relations Act.
This is the plan in its broad outline. Let us now examine each component
part.
B. The National Labor Representation Board
The new Board, which we shall continue to call the NLRB, should be
equipped to operate the representation and election procedures under both
statutes with a reasonable degree of uniformity. Although the statutory
language of section 2, Ninth of the RLA and section 9 of the NLRA are
different, both provide for wide agency discretion in the determination of
"appropriate bargaining unit""" or "craft or class...... I know of no reason
in law why the election procedures under both statutes could not be sub-
stantially identical if the new Board chose to make them so. Or the pro-
cedures could be different if the Board were to find appropriate grounds
for making distinctions. The important factor is that the Board, established
as an expert body, should be qualified to exercise an informed judgment
in recognizing basic differences affecting the representation process among
various industries, as well as any inherent differences existing in the legis-
lation itself. The Board's rules, regulations, and orders would be expected
to reflect those differences. The exercise of such judgment is a role familiar
to the administrative process. " '
C. The General Labor Counsel
The two statutes under consideration were designed primarily to protect
employees. "7 For this reason, there should be a federal administrative officer
"
5 4 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944). But see Taft-Hartley amendments,
§§ 9(b) (1), 9(b) (2), 9(b) (3), and 9(c) (5).
... Bhd. Ry. Clerks v. Ass'n for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965);
Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
"'See L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 555-64 (1965).
.. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); National Labor Relations
Act SS1 and 7, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Star. 136, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 and 157 (1964).
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available to prosecute violations under both statutes. To illustrate the point,
if all employees aggrieved by discriminatory union action were required
to hire private attorneys to prosecute their cases, relatively few of these
cases would be processed adequately to conclusion. Yet that is exactly
what is presently required under the Railway Labor Act. Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, however, the General Counsel is charged with
representing the public interest and is available to prosecute such cases.'es
The new General Labor Counsel should, therefore, have the same respon-
sibility under both Acts.
Additional duties of this office would probably include processing and
making initial decisions in representation cases, just as that function is
now performed by the regional directors pursuant to authority delegated
from the NLRB. e' The basic structure and function of the regional offices
of the NLRB could therefore be preserved, though expanded in responsi-
bility to include corresponding duties under the RLA. The regional direc-
tors could thus assume some of the representational functions now per-
formed by employees of the National Mediation Board, such as conducting
elections and investigating objections relating to elections. It is also pro-
posed that the new General Labor Counsel would have the right to inter-
vene in any action brought by a private party in the United States Labor
Court.7 '
D. The United States Labor Court
The jurisdiction of the United States Labor Court would extend to en-
forcement of rights and duties under the Railway Labor Act and the
Labor-Management Relations Act. Jurisdiction under the former statute
would be essentially the same as that now exercised by the United States
district courts. Jurisdiction under the LMRA would include not only un-
fair labor practices under section 8 of the NLRA,"7' but also sections
208,'3 209,"' and 210"74 (the provisions relating to injunctions in national
emergency disputes), section 301.75 (the provisions for enforcement of
In Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), the Supreme Court emphasized the public
rights aspect of the NLRA.
'E.g., Rubber Wkrs. Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 837 (1967); Automotive Plating Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 121, (1968).
1" RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD § 102.67(a).
170 See note 182, infra, and accompanying text.
171National Labor Relations Act, 44 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.
538 (1964). The determination of unfair labor practices is a judicial function. Unlike the NLRB's
role in representation cases under section 9 (29 U.S.C. § 159), cf. Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB,
- U.S. -, 89 S. Ct. 1426 (1969), legislative "rule-making" is not a function inherent in the
finding and remedying of unfair labor practices. Thus, no real question is posed relating to the
constitutional separation of powers. Even as to the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, whose functions included certain nonjudicial activities (such as exercising revisory
authority) the Supreme Court in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 583 (1962), see notes
160-63 and accompanying text, held "that, if necessary the particular offensive jurisdiction, and
not the courts, would fall."
172 Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 178,
amending 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
"
3 1d. at 29 U.S.C. § 179.
14 Id. at 29 U.S.C. 5 180.
'7 Id. at 29 U.S.C. 5 185.
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labor agreements), section 302170 (the section relating to restrictions on
payments to employee representatives), and section 303 "' (the secondary
boycott damage suit provisions).
Inasmuch as the Court would be organized under Article III of the Con-
stitution, its judges would be appointed for life by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. These appointments could pose a serious
problem of political imbalance if they were all made at the same time, or,
for that matter, if they were made by a single President. This problem
might be lessened by the spreading of judicial appointments over at least
two presidential terms. Such a piecemeal increase in the size of the Court
would be matched by a piecemeal transfer of jurisdiction from the present
National Labor Relations Board to the Court. The following suggested
time-schedule of effective dates is intended, therefore, to achieve a measure
of political balance among the initial appointees to the Court, and also to
provide for an orderly transfer of jurisdiction from the NLRB during
the period in which the Court is gaining in both size and experience.
A court of eleven judges is tentatively proposed. However, this entire
number would not be achieved until six years after passage of the en-
abling legislation; only five of the judges would be appointed immediately.
Two additional judges would be appointed at the end of the Court's first
three years of operation, and the last four judges would be appointed three
years later. It is expected that Congress would authorize additional judges
from time to time if the need should arise.
The full statutory jurisdiction of the Court would also be acquired over
a six year period. I suggest that the Court's jurisdiction for the initial
three years be confined to the principal areas over which the United States
district courts already have jurisdiction, i.e., over enforcement of the Rail-
way Labor Act, over actions under section 301 of the LMRA, over the
issuance of temporary injunctive relief under sections 10(j) and 10(1)
of the NLRA and over enforcement of sections 302 and 303 of the
LMRA. In addition, from the very beginning the Court should be able to
exercise pendant jurisdiction.. over actions which ultimately are to be in-
cluded in the Court's regular jurisdiction. To avoid abuse of this practice
by a party who might seek to extend the Court's jurisdiction through
joinder of an unfair labor practice charge with a frivolous or insignificant
claim within the Court's initial jurisdiction, the Court would be empowered
to exercise discretion whether to assert jurisdiction over the unfair labor
practice charge.' It is intended that the NLRB would continue to be the
principal forum for unfair labor practice cases during these first three
years of the Court's operation. Certain types of cases, however, would be
especially appropriate for the exercise of pendant jurisdiction. For example,
an unfair labor practice charge alleging violation of sections 8 (b) (1) (A),
8 (b) (2) and 8 (b) (3) of the NLRA, charging a union with a breach of
176 Id. at 29 U.S.C. § 186.
177 Id. at 29 U.S.C. § 187.
17'Cf. United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
179 Id. Such discretionary power is already inherent in the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction.
[Vol. 3 5
LABOR LAW PROCEDURAL REFORM
its duty of fair representation in failing to process a discharge grievance,
could and should be joined with a section 301 action against the employer,
where the validity of the claim depends, in whole or in part, upon a finding
that the employer has violated the collective agreement.
At the end of three years, the Court's second jurisdictional stage would
be reached. Its statutory jurisdiction would then be expanded to cover
the following sections of the National Labor Relations Act: Section
8 (a) (1) (relating to interference by employers with protected employee
rights); section 8 (b) (1) (relating to union interference with protected
employee rights) ; section 8 (a) (2) (relating to employer domination and
support of labor organizations); section 8 (a) (3) (relating to discrimi-
nation in employment practiced by employers); section 8 (b) (2) (relating
to union induced employment discrimination) ; section 8 (a) (4) (relating
to protection of employees who file charges or testify under the Act);
section 8 (b) (5) (relating to excessive union initiation fees). These unfair
labor practice sections concern rights of employees as individuals.
Three years later the Court would acquire its remaining jurisdiction.
That acquisition would cover those provisions of the NLRA which relate
generally to forms of unlawful activity which unions and employers might
direct toward each other, rather than toward employees. These include un-
fair labor practices which are immediately concerned with the operation
of collective bargaining and the use of economic weapons: Sections 8 (a) (5)
and 8 (b) (3) (defining the duty to bargain collectively) ; section 8 (b) (4)
(relating to secondary activity and jurisdictional disputes) ; section 8 (e)
(proscribing "hot-cargo" agreements) ; section 8 (b) (7) (relating to
picketing for organization and recognition) ; and section 8 (b) (6) (relat-
ing to "featherbedding"). However, none of the lines dividing the three
jurisdictional stages should be drawn too sharply because the typical NLRB
complaint case covers a wide range of unfair labor practices. It is recognized
that during the transitional stage it may be difficult to determine whether a
particular case should be filed with the lame duck NLRB or with the
United States Labor Court. Guidelines would therefore have to be devised;
these details, however, are beyond the score of a preliminary paper.
In many respects, the organization of the Court would resemble the
United States Court of Claims.1 Commissioners, similar in function to
those attached to the Court of Claims,18' would replace the present NLRB
trial examiners as hearing officers in most of the contested cases. Incum-
bent NLRB trial examiners would undoubtedly be eligible to become the
Court's first commissioners. Selection of the cases, or types of cases, to be
heard by the commissioners should be left to the discretion of the Court.
Moreover, the Court should decide the details of its own organizational
structure. Though it may be assumed that the Court's headquarters would
be in Washington, D.C., it should have authority to sit anywhere in the
United States or its territories. Regular terms of the Court could be held in
major metropolitan areas. The Court would be empowered to sit en banc,
18062 Stat. 941, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1492 (1966).
18' U.S. CT. CL. RULES 52-57.
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in panels, or as a single judge. Single judges might act on pleas for tempo-
rary injunctive relief, or might be assigned to jury trials in those limited
types of cases where a party would be entitled to a jury-for example, in
secondary boycott actions for damages under section 303 of LMRA. In
addition to the Court's permanent judges, other federal judges would sit
from time to time to aid in handling the docket.
It is anticipated that most cases would be heard initially by commis-
sioners. The extent of the commissioners' authority to hear evidence and
make rulings or recommendations would probably be determined princi-
pally by the Court, although some legislative guidelines or limitations as to
their authority might be appropriate. Further study on this question is
necessary; it is suggested, however, that the guiding principle for estab-
lishment of the Court's structure should be to allow the Court sufficient
operational flexibility to achieve effective and efficient employment of both
judges and commissioners. A certain amount of trial and error will prob-
ably be essential to the development of any effectual plan of operation.
A major element in the proposed plan is that actions in the United
States Labor Court may be initiated by either the General Labor Counsel
or by a private party."2 Invoking the procedure through the General
Labor Counsel would be similar to that now prevailing under the NLRA,
with one major exception: Whenever a charge is filed with the General
Labor Counsel, it would be the duty of his office to conduct an investiga-
tion; his office would then either dismiss the charge or file a complaint
with the Court; in the event of dismissal, the charging party could file
and process his own case in Court-unlike the present procedure under
the NLRA, where a charging party has no recourse after the General
Counsel refuses to issue a complaint. Under the suggested plan, the General
Labor Counsel would have the right to intervene in any action filed by a
private party, including those actions not initiated by a charge filed with
his office. Moreover, a party would have the right to file an action (com-
plaint) in the Court without prior filing of a charge with the General
Labor Counsel.
The Court would have essentially the same authority as any United
States district court for issuance of appropriate legal process, orders and
judgments. For example, dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted would be available to the Court
where appropriate. Likewise, summary judgments, temporary restraining
orders and injunctions, to name only a few possible orders, would also be
available. Only slight accommodation with the Norris-LaGuardia Act'
would be necessary for inclusion in the enabling legislation in order for
182 Compare: (1) Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. (1964), enforcement
through back wage suits brought by the Secretary of Labor, § 16(c), and by individual employees,
§ 16(b); (2) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., enforcement
by individual civil suits, § 706(e) and (f), and also by suits filed by the Attorney General when
he "has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or
practice of resistance .. ." 707(a). (For a similar allocation of enforcement rights, see also
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3612, 3613 (1969)).
... Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (1964).
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the Court to issue injunctions, for such injunctive power already exists
under the Railway Labor Act,'" and the Court would continue to have
authority under sections 10 (j) and 10 (1) of the Taft-Hartley Act, assum-
ing the minor procedural adjustments needed to reflect the basic re-
structuring of the administrative-judicial relationship are made.
The plan contemplates no legislative changes in judicial authority to
review adjustment board awards under the Railway Labor Act or arbi-
tration procedures and awards under section 301 of Taft-Hartley. It is
anticipated, however, that the Court's broad jurisdiction over both the
collective bargaining process and the collective bargaining contract would
stimulate the fashioning of flexible remedies, including some new remedies.
For example, in an unfair labor practice proceeding under the NLRA,
the Court would be able to require submission of an arbitral matter to an
arbitrator, with the Court retaining jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing
and/or reviewing the resulting arbitration award. The Court could also
refer or remand a question concerning representation to the NLRB for
its determination whenever appropriate, because the representation matter
may require agency determination prior to a judicial decision on the merits
of the complaint. The detailed mechanics of such referral and remand
procedures need not be explored in the present paper. It suffices to note
that the Court would have sufficient authority to fashion remedies that
would more nearly reflect the Congressional intent in the two statutes
than those to which the present tribunals are now limited.
Although most of the Court's jurisdiction would embrace cases that will
have been initially submitted to a subordinate tribunal-to arbitration,
to an adjustment board, or to the NLRB for determination of representa-
tion questions-the Court itself should possess original jurisdiction of these
cases in a judicial sense. The Court's orders would thus be self-enforcing
and resort to a court of appeals would not be necessary for enforcement
purposes.'85 However, the present role of the various courts of appeals
would be maintained for appellate purposes. A party would be entitled
to appeal a judgment of the United States Labor Court similar to the
manner in which an appeal is now taken from a decision of a United
States district court. No change is contemplated in appellate jurisdiction.
The continued scattering of appellate review among the eleven United
States courts of appeals is likely to produce a healthy cross-fertilization of
judicial attitudes, which should counterbalance any tendency toward over-
specialized expertise which might otherwise develop within the United
States Labor Court. Final reconciliation of differences among the circuits
would naturally be the responsibility of the Supreme Court through the
exercise of its power of certiorari.
184Bhd. of Ry. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957); Virginia
Ry. v. System Fed'n 40, Ry. Employees, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Texas & N.O. R.R. Co. v. Bhd.
of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
185Contrast National Labor Relations Act § 10(e) with § 10(f) (29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f),
158 (1964), amending 49 Stat. 452 (1935)).
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E. The Mediation Service
A merger of the National Mediation Board and the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service is suggested. This new National Mediation Service
would confine itself to providing the mediation and conciliation functions
authorized by the RLA and LMRA. It would also continue to provide
assistance in the selection of neutrals to serve on adjustment and arbitra-
tion boards.
V. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS
The suggested plan must now be tested-at least on paper. Although
an intensive study should be conducted in order to provide comprehensive
data on the problem areas which have been touched on in this article,
some preliminary conclusions, based on existing evidence, may be ad-
vanced. The overall conclusion is that the proposed allocation of functions
between the new court and the modified administrative bodies would pro-
vide a fruitful means for achieving the objectives of the two basic collec-
tive bargaining statutes.
As previously noted, among the chief drawbacks of the Railway Labor
Act are the archaic representation procedures employed by the National
Mediation Board and the shackles which that Board and the statute itself
have placed on collective bargaining. Separating representation ald elec-
tion procedures from the mediation process, and assigning both functions
to agencies that are charged with similar responsibilities under the Labor-
Management Relations Act, might release a viable potential for successful
collective bargaining which was once thought to exist under the RLA.
Also of importance, the new Labor Court, with assistance from a General
Labor Counsel, would provide a needed forum for employee redress from
union violations of the duty of fair representation.
The package of benefits which may be expected from application of
the proposed procedures to the Labor-Management Relations Act will be
of equal, if not greater significance. As presently constituted, the NLRB
is unable to fulfill some of the major objectives of the statute. This is not
the personal fault of either the Members of the Board or the General
Counsel; nor can earlier Board personnel be blamed. After 34 years of
operation under various political administrations, and with a normal turn-
over in Board personnel, it may reasonably be assumed that the principal
fault lies in the procedural structure which Congress provided. There may
have been a time when the administrative agency concept was suitable
for the enforcement of unfair labor practice jurisdiction under the NLRA.
That time might have been during the early days of the Wagner Act. This
point has long been argued; but the issue is now moot for today the NLRB
cannot adequately cope with the new generation of labor problems. To
put it candidly, it is a mistake to expect an administrative agency to ac-
complish tasks which only a court can perform. The NLRB is not a court;
it cannot issue temporary restraining orders, temporary injunctions or any
orders, including final decisions on the merits, that are automatically en-
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forceable. This lack of instant process-and process enforceable by its own
contempt power-appears to be the principal cause of the low inci-
dence of voluntary compliance with the Act. Now in its fourth decade,
the NLRB must still handle, on a case-by-case basis, far too many matters
involving fundamental rights of employees to engage in protected con-
duct. No other major civil statute in the federal law has achieved so little
voluntary compliance after so long a period.
Because the NLRB is usually unable to react with the most appropriate
procedures and remedies to fit particular situations, respondents and po-
tential respondents in Board actions have little fear of what the Board
might do to them. Thus, time is a weapon in disputes relating to the
establishment of collective bargaining, and the slow pace of the Board's
process works against the very employees whom the Board is supposed to
be protecting. When the Board finally does act, it may be too late to
restore even a semblance of the status quo. Accordingly, the Board's re-
medial process really frightens no one. To illustrate the point, if temporary
injunctions were readily available in section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) dis-
charge cases, it is likely that relatively few such discharges would require
final litigation on the merits. Of perhaps greater import, the number of
such violations would probably decrease because the incentive for most
of these discharges would be removed. Year after year large numbers of
employees are discharged to "discourage membership"'" in labor organiza-
tions. However, if the government had the means to deal swiftly with
such cases by obtaining prompt reinstatement where it could show reason-
able cause to believe that a violation has occured, the advantage attribut-
able to the action would shift to the union. This does not now happen
because the Board has no instant process, and prompt judicial action is
unavailable. A dramatic example of how effective an injunction can be
in a discharge case occured a few years ago in a section 10 (j) proceeding.
It required six months of effort before the Board's cumbersome machinery
produced the 10 (j) petition, but when it was finally filed, its effect was
felt almost immediately. The facts of the case were simple. Four popular
union adherents had been discharged at the beginning of a union orga-
nizing campaign, obviously setting back the campaign. Had there been
no injunction, the union would probably have lost the election, for if re-
instatement of the employees had to await the usual year or two of NLRB
litigation, the apparent inability of the union and the government to
protect the employees during the critical pre-election period would itself
have interfered with the free exercise of section 7 rights. In McLuhan
terms, the NLRB medium is the message. However, in the subject case
the NLRB was saved from itself. Unlike thousands of similar cases, this
one reached a federal judge just in time for the election. The judge was
properly annoyed with the Board's delay in filing the section 10 (j) action-
perhaps he did not realize that' the unusual feature of the case was that
t" National Labor Relations Act 5 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 136 (1936), as amended, 28 U.S.C.
58 (1964), amending 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
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the action was filed at all."' Yet, he found the evidence convincing and
enjoined the company, with this lecture from the bench:
The conclusion that I reach here is that the company-and I don't blame
them for it-but apparently it is against the law to do so--the company was
protecting itself against being unionized and they just thought-as I would
probably if I didn't know the law-that the best thing to do was to clip them
at the bud. "Boys, get all these leaders out of here. Scare the rest of them."
And that is what happened in this case, and I have reasonable cause to
believe that those four men, all four of them, were discharged because of
union activities and for no other reason.
And I therefore am going to order that they be reinstated by the Com-
pany ....
Mr. __ , that is the order and I am giving it to you here. Mandatory
injunction. You and all the other officers of your company .... [Y]ou offer
these four men ... either the job they had at the time of discharge or similar
position."'
Here was the judicial mystique at work. The judge represented the full
authority of the judicial power of the United States. His personal presence
and his personal order accomplished what an anonymous order of the
NLRB can rarely accomplish alone. The union won the election and the
four section 8 (a) (3) cases were quickly settled with back pay and con-
tinued employment.
Injunctions are not enough. A labor court must be an expert court,
and it must carry on a tradition of interpreting a broad statute in accord-
ance with national policy. The unspecialized United States district courts,
as their record of interpreting the Railway Labor Act has demonstrated,
cannot do this. Specialization and uniformity cannot be achieved by hun-
dreds of different judges acting independently of one another. The Labor
Court could supply expertise and uniformity.
The proposed Labor Court could also provide for discovery under rules
comparable to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This should elimi-
nate the need for formal hearings in many cases, and voluntary settle-
ments would also be encouraged. This has been common practice in the
federal courts since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1938. Alexander Holtzoff's early comment on the Federal Rules re-
mains accurate:
The elimination of the "sporting theory" of justice, the simplification of
procedure, and the prompt disposition of controversies on the merits are the
great objectives of the new federal civil practice. One of the principal means
for the attainment of these purposes is discovery, by which a disclosure may
be obtained in respect of all pertinent inforfnation in the possession of any
party to a litigation .... "
117 During that same year, the NLRB sought 10 (j) injunctions in only 2 cases involving 8 (a) (3)
violations. THIRTIETH ANNUAL REPORT oF ri-E NLRB 214 (1965).
..8 Clifford W. Potter, Regional Director v. United Foods, Inc., Civil Action No. 64-B-104
(S.D. Texas, Brownsville Div. 1965).
.. Holtzhoff, Instruments of Discovery under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MICH.
L. REv. 205 (1942).
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Because discovery may disclose substantially all of the material evidence
in advance of trial, and participating attorneys can thus intelligently evalu-
ate the merits of the case, parties are more likely to enter into pre-trial
settlements. But even when settlement is unattainable, the discovery process
may lead to a summary judgment or at least to a shorter trial. In con-
trast, the NLRB is truly a "horse and buggy" agency in the tedious way
in which it handles cases. With administrative determination separated
from judicial enforcement, and with appellate review a prerequisite for
enforcement, there is little wonder that some parties use the Board's own
process as a buffer against organizational activity.
On the other hand, the Board acts more quickly against unions when
they are involved in section 8 (b) (4) and 8 (b) (7) violations, but only
because section 10 (1) makes mandatory the filing of petitions for injunc-
tions in such cases. Expedited action may thus be obtained, but perhaps
at the expense of other values. The district courts, under section 10 (1),
must routinely grant injunctions when "the officer or regional attorney
• . . has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a com-
plaint should issue." In most cases there is probably no injustice in this
inflexible procedure, but the statutory imposition of such a rigid require-
ment on a non-specialized court prevents early disposition of the under-
lying dispute and may unjustly pre-determine a strike by the sheer power
of the injunction, regardless of the ultimate disposition of the case. A
specialized court could consolidate the hearing on a temporary injunction
with a hearing on the merits, or make whatever order was appropriate
under the circumstances.
Another important area where the suggested Labor Court would im-
prove on the NLRB's performance is in the matter of certainty and pre-
dictability in the decision-making process. Policy shifts from one Board
to the next, and inconsistencies in interpreting and applying the statute
from one administration to another, benefit no one in the long run. These
decisional deviations give violators and opponents of the Act a scapegoat
in the Board. On the other hand, pronouncements by a court, especially a
federal court, ordinarily carry that authority which an impersonal federal
agency is incapable of conveying. The image of a tribunal matters greatly
in successful law enforcement.
Defenders of the NLRB status quo often point with pride to the Board's
capacity to exercise specialized and expert judgment. Such a quality, how-
ever, need not be a monopoly of an administrative agency; a specialized
court might succeed in bettering the Board's record on this score. More-
over, the great innovator in labor relations has been the Supreme Court,
not the NLRB. But the revised NLRB would have an opportunity to con-
tinue to exercise inventiveness in processing representation cases and elec-
tion procedures.' Flexibility in rule-making for representation matters
may be more desirable than for unfair labor practices, where stare decisis
is both a virtue and a necessity. Furthermore, the Board's expertise as an
'0 Supra p. 562.
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innovator in unfair labor practice cases may be based as much on myth as
on fact, for many of the Board's most famous innovations have fallen by
the judicial wayside. To name a few of the major casualties: the Mountain
Pacific"' doctrine, the Brown-Olds" remedy, the Washington Coca-Cola"'°
doctrine, the American National Insurance'" case, the Insurance Agents"
case, the American Ship Building'" case, and the Babcock and Wilcox..
case. Furthermore, it was the Supreme Court, not the NLRB, that de-
veloped the doctrine of fair representation; the Board did not adopt it
until twenty years later. Also, in Town and Country" and Fibreboard,"'
the Board followed a doctrine which the Supreme Court had already estab-
lished in Telegraphers v. Chicago FJ N.W.R. Co." Thus, the conclusion
may be drawn that a court is as likely to develop new and acceptable ap-
proaches as is an administrative board. And it may be more likely to be
successful on judicial review.
Another advantage which might be expected from the proposed Labor
Court is that different types of actions, such as unfair labor practices and
contract violations, may be joined in the same proceeding. This would
not have been of great importance 30 years ago, but today, with so much
organized industry and so many disputes arising out of existing collective
bargaining relations, the Board is unable and unsuited to determine with
finality many of these disputes. Since the emphasis in collective bargaining
in this country should continue to be based on voluntary action, a Labor
Court with jurisdiction over contract enforcement as well as unfair labor
practices, could make judicial determinations and fashion remedies which
would utilize arbitration and other voluntary means. As noted previously,
in the area of fair representation there is a particular need for joinder of
actions and flexibility of remedies. Similar advantages could be made
applicable to many actions under the Railway Labor Act.
The proposed plan could also help to improve the mediation system.
The voluntary nature of mediation and the absence of sanctions may be
its real strength. The federal mediator has nothing to sell but his good
offices, which consist primarily of his personal ability to persuade, to listen,
and to suggest. But whatever the qualities he brings to the bargaining
table, it is generally agreed that his services are a valuable aid to the col-
lective bargaining process. Although mediation procedures and conditions
under which mediation is invoked differ markedly under the two statutes,
the personalized nature of the job of mediating is similar under each.
A merger of the mediation functions of the FMCS and the NMB should
'9Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
19Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961).
"'Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Wks., 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953). See Plauche Elec. Inc.,
135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962), and cases cited therein.
"°4American Nat'l Ins. v. NLRB, 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
'O NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
"'American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
""NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
1"8 Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforcing, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir.
1963).
... Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
209362 U.S. 330 (1960).
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provide an opportunity for both groups of mediators to share valuable
experiences and techniques. Also, one mediation agency should be more
economical to operate than two, and a single agency should provide for a
more centralized and uniform direction to the service. Perhaps most im-
portant, however, there would be a separation of mediation from the
adjudicatory functions of the NMB. If mediators can confine their efforts
to mediation, which the NMB as an agency cannot do under the present
RLA, their roles as neutrals may yield greater success in assisting parties
in reaching bargaining agreements.
It would unduly prolong this paper to detail the anticipated effect of
the proposed plan on each of the problem areas previously outlined; but
it is suggested that the reader himself make these comparisons, for the
plan purports to offer a means to eliminate or at least to mitigate most of
these problems. Probable effects on the items noted earlier are summarized
briefly in the following paragraphs.
Under the Railway Labor Act it is expected that the plan would: (1)
Help achieve more realistic bargaining units, especially in the airline in-
dustry; (2) improve representation procedures and provide an opportu-
nity for presentation of carrier views; (3) provide adequate machinery to
settle representation disputes; (4) avoid most of the jurisdictional con-
flicts which exist among tribunals enforcing the Act; (5) probably pro-
vide a means for decertification of employee representatives; (6) probably
provide a "no" vote in representation elections; (7) achieve uniform
judicial enforcement and interpretation of the Act; (8) provide an officer
who would assist in enforcing rights under the Act, especially rights of
individual employees; (9) provide more freedom of choice to employees
in the exercise of their rights of representation; (10) make the major-
minor distinction more meaningful and help prevent such a distinction
from interfering with the expeditious settlement of labor disputes; (11)
separate mediation from adjudication; (12) reduce some of the delays in
collective bargaining.
Under the Labor-Management Relations Act it is expected that the
plan would: (1) Virtually eliminate the pendulum-like shifts in decisional
law which have characterized NLRB action in preceding years; (2) in-
crease voluntary acceptance of the requirements of the Act; (3) speed
up the enforcement process; (4) provide for instant judicial process when
and where needed; (5) eliminate or substantially reduce the conflict be-
tween unfair labor practice jurisdiction and the arbitration process; (6)
provide for joinder of actions, particularly in fair representation cases;
(7) provide for a more efficient decisional process; (8) provide for pre-
trial discovery; (9) eliminate the absolute power of the General Counsel
to dismiss a charge without review; and (10) reduce the incidence of
appellate review.
The plan is not expected to be a panacea. However, I believe that it
may offer a fair and functional means to improve the enforcement and
administration of the two major collective bargaining statutes.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article is a plea for statesmanship in the development of new labor
legislation. With minority groups creating new forms of concerted activity
for the purpose of asserting their claims for equal treatment within the
industrial establishment, with collective bargaining reaching an institu-
tional plateau, and with modern industry devising new technologies and
new types of business entities, a streamlined judicial and administrative
procedure needs to be established to cope with such new problems and to
adequately handle the old ones.
We live in an age of industrial interdependence. The distinction between
industries covered by the Railway Labor Act and those covered by the
Labor-Management Relations Act have become increasingly artificial and
irrelevant. For example, containerized cargo moves back and forth between
coverage of both Acts, because warehousing, longshore, shipping and motor
carrier operations are covered by the LMRA, whereas railroads and airlines
are covered by the RLA. To cite another example, employees of inde-
pendent aircraft maintenance companies may be covered by the LMRA
even though they service aircraft whose crews and related personnel are
covered by the RLA. By any standard, it is difficult to justify two separate
statutes. However, substantive unification, providing for a single statute
covering airlines, railroads and other industries, seems unattainable at the
present time. Although the plan which I have outlined seeks to unify
procedures only, in time, unified procedures could lead to unified sub-
stantive law-whether by administrative practice, judicial interpretation,
new legislation or by a combination of all these means. Inasmuch as
procedural unification may be an attainable goal, the suggested plan could
provide a substantial first step toward achieving unification of all federal
law relating to collective bargaining.
I have attempted to identify the principal problem areas and to pro-
pose a working hypothesis that might provide a reasonable means to re-
duce or eliminate some of the major difficulties in the administration and
enforcement of the collective bargaining statutes. The conclusions, how-
ever, are tentative. Hopefully, collective bargaining has sufficiently come
of age so that labor and management, working with other interested groups,
can now join in a common effort to improve the operation of the collective
bargaining system. It is my thesis that this improvement can be accom-
plished without fundamentally changing the substantive law. But even
if the plan which I have proposed proves to be unacceptable, a constructive
effort should nevertheless be made to devise another approach to fill the
need-for the need is great.
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